In an infinite universe, there are infinitely many copies of you (infinitely many of which are Boltzmann brains
That might be true if “you” are a snapshot , or observer moment. Long lasting Boltzman brains are vanishingly unlikely, OTOH. Time in general is a problem for multiversal theories.
the least complex description of your conscious experience is the description of an external lawful universe and directions for finding the substructure embodying your experience within that substructure.
Why isn’t it solipsism? Why is a large universe plus a long “address” simpler than a small universe plus a short address?
A quantum mechanical state can be described as a linear combination of “classical” configurations
It doesn’t have to be, though.
The fact that we are described by algorithm A rather than B is no more or less mysterious than the fact that the laws of physics are like so instead of some other way.
Then you are not actually deriving the Born rule from UDASSA.
That might be true if “you” are a snapshot , or observer moment. Long lasting Boltzman brains are vanishingly unlikely, OTOH. Time in general is a problem for multiversal theories.
Why isn’t it solipsism? Why is a large universe plus a long “address” simpler than a small universe plus a short address?
It doesn’t have to be, though.
Then you are not actually deriving the Born rule from UDASSA.