Plus, most things can’t destroy the expected value of the future by 10%. You just can’t have that many things, otherwise there’s not going to be any value left in the end.
I don’t understand. Maybe it is just the case that there’s no value left after a large number of things that reduces the expected value by 10%?
Paul is implicitly conditioning his actions on being in a world where there’s a decent amount of expected value left for his actions to affect. This is technically part of a decision procedure, rather than a statement about epistemic credences, but it’s confusing because he frames it as an epistemic credence.
From the transcript with Paul Christiano.
I don’t understand. Maybe it is just the case that there’s no value left after a large number of things that reduces the expected value by 10%?
Paul is implicitly conditioning his actions on being in a world where there’s a decent amount of expected value left for his actions to affect. This is technically part of a decision procedure, rather than a statement about epistemic credences, but it’s confusing because he frames it as an epistemic credence.
See also this thread.