There is SSSSA – super strong sampling assumption, which suggests to weight minds proportionally to their intelligence and it is similar to your proposal. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.03078 It has its own Doomsday argument—that superintelligent minds are impossible.
However, my argument doesn’t depend on that and it claims that I should exclude from my reference class all minds which are definitely not in my epistemic situation. For example, Sleeping Beauty always knows all her experiment details. But if she forgets all of them on every Tuesday and knows that on Monday, she can reason: “as I now know about anthropics, I am not on Tuesday” and this change the whole experiment. (However, this is not related to some random elements of her experience, but only to the necessary ones, and here is the difference with Full Non-indexical Conditioning and Beauty-Technicolor.)
In other words, I treat all my non-necessary parts as randomly selected, and this includes my birthday date in some extent.
Regarding the linked paper: Let’s take SSSSA but weight by level of consciousness rather than by level of intelligence. Then anthropic reasoning rules out super-consciousness but does not rule out super-intelligence. In particular, anthropic reasoning is enough to rule out scenarios where there are galaxies full of enormous numbers of conscious AIs or real or uploaded humans. However it’s not enough to rule out scenarios where an unconscious or minimally conscious AI becomes smart enough to outperform humans in every domain. In fact, Integrated information Theory suggests that current AIs are not particularly conscious and we’re not far off from AGI.
Yes, agree about this consciousness version of Doomsday argument. But what is limited: number of different qualia? Number of qualia that can be expirienced simultaneously? Clarity?
There is SSSSA – super strong sampling assumption, which suggests to weight minds proportionally to their intelligence and it is similar to your proposal. https://arxiv.org/abs/1705.03078 It has its own Doomsday argument—that superintelligent minds are impossible.
However, my argument doesn’t depend on that and it claims that I should exclude from my reference class all minds which are definitely not in my epistemic situation. For example, Sleeping Beauty always knows all her experiment details. But if she forgets all of them on every Tuesday and knows that on Monday, she can reason: “as I now know about anthropics, I am not on Tuesday” and this change the whole experiment. (However, this is not related to some random elements of her experience, but only to the necessary ones, and here is the difference with Full Non-indexical Conditioning and Beauty-Technicolor.)
In other words, I treat all my non-necessary parts as randomly selected, and this includes my birthday date in some extent.
Ok, sorry you’re right about that.
Regarding the linked paper: Let’s take SSSSA but weight by level of consciousness rather than by level of intelligence. Then anthropic reasoning rules out super-consciousness but does not rule out super-intelligence. In particular, anthropic reasoning is enough to rule out scenarios where there are galaxies full of enormous numbers of conscious AIs or real or uploaded humans. However it’s not enough to rule out scenarios where an unconscious or minimally conscious AI becomes smart enough to outperform humans in every domain. In fact, Integrated information Theory suggests that current AIs are not particularly conscious and we’re not far off from AGI.
Yes, agree about this consciousness version of Doomsday argument. But what is limited: number of different qualia? Number of qualia that can be expirienced simultaneously? Clarity?
Weight observer moments by the number of bits of integrated information?