Humans are reinforced by tasty food, sex, accumulation of material goods, flow, laughter, love/empathy, status bumps
This is hardly an exhaustive list. We’re also reinforced, for example, by people we like being happy, especially in relation to us. This is the type of reinforcement I’m talking about.
When my wife smiles because of something I did for her, the warm feeling I get does not resemble the feeling of status elevation. This is even more relevant in the case of, say, a stranger thanking me for holding the door—I don’t know them and don’t really care what status they assign me.
Finally, I really don’t understand what you’re arguing for here. Specifically, I fail to see where you are offering any different actual advice for people to carry out, and we agree that insincere appreciation equals status-lowering.
We only appear to disagree on whether status-raising is a requirement for appreciation to be reinforcing… and there, you seem to have retreated to the position that any sort of positive appreciation affords a status grant, even if no increase in relative status results.
But it does not appear to me that your argument is other than definitional: that is, I do not understand why it’s important to you to assume that all actions either generate or consume status points, as opposed to say, viewing some actions as being status-neutral. Which way you look at it strikes me as being merely dependent on how you choose to frame the math, and that there is no strong reason to prefer one framing over the other.
Actually, if I were to follow what seems to be your model, where people need to be repeatedly filled with status-giving gestures in order to merely maintain their current status position, then I would either have to have a model for how status deflation occurs, or else assume that everybody’s status is always increasing in the absence of any actions taken to decrease status. This seems incoherent to me, especially since it would imply that older people would nearly always have higher status than younger people, a correlation which doesn’t hold much past adulthood.
At this point, unless you clarify your model of status and what it is exactly that you think we differ on, I don’t see much point in continuing this thread. (Honestly, I’m not sure why you started it in the first place.)
When my wife smiles because of something I did for her, the warm feeling I get does not resemble the feeling of status elevation.
The fact that she chose you as her partner, instead of other potential candidates, gives you some status (not relative to her, but relative to all other real or imaginary candidates). Could this play some role in your feelings from her smile?
This is even more relevant in the case of, say, a stranger thanking me for holding the door—I don’t know them and don’t really care what status they assign me.
A stranger thanking you for holding the door confirms that you belong to a set of polite people. Not everyone is in this set, and people in this set have higher status than people outside of the set.
You are right, a clear definition of status is necessary, otherwise pretty much anything can be “explained” by status. But I suspect that if a meaningful definition is made, it will allow transactions of type: person X is increasing status of person Y without decreasing their own status (by decreasing status of someone else, for example an unspecified absent person).
a stranger thanking me for holding the door—I don’t know them and don’t really care what status they assign me.
The “really” in that statement hides a lot of ambiguity. Here, the status assigned to you fails evolution’s consequentialist calculation, so one might say that evolution shouldn’t care what status strangers in a big city assign you. Your psychological adaptations might still care, in the sense that they get activated, not having recognized absence of evolution-relevant consequences.
On the other hand, the psychological drive may be seen as representing a terminal value, preference for accumulation of status for its own sake, irrespective of its effect on other people’s behavior or of the impact of their behavior on you. In that case, one may say that you should care. It would still be the case that you should care even if the relevant psychological adaptations don’t in fact activate, so that you happen to not care in the psychological sense.
The “really” in that statement hides a lot of ambiguity.
Not really. ;-)
It specifically meant, “I don’t care as long as they don’t assign me low status”, i.e., threaten my status with their response. That’s not a lot of ambiguity.
This is hardly an exhaustive list. We’re also reinforced, for example, by people we like being happy, especially in relation to us. This is the type of reinforcement I’m talking about.
When my wife smiles because of something I did for her, the warm feeling I get does not resemble the feeling of status elevation. This is even more relevant in the case of, say, a stranger thanking me for holding the door—I don’t know them and don’t really care what status they assign me.
Finally, I really don’t understand what you’re arguing for here. Specifically, I fail to see where you are offering any different actual advice for people to carry out, and we agree that insincere appreciation equals status-lowering.
We only appear to disagree on whether status-raising is a requirement for appreciation to be reinforcing… and there, you seem to have retreated to the position that any sort of positive appreciation affords a status grant, even if no increase in relative status results.
But it does not appear to me that your argument is other than definitional: that is, I do not understand why it’s important to you to assume that all actions either generate or consume status points, as opposed to say, viewing some actions as being status-neutral. Which way you look at it strikes me as being merely dependent on how you choose to frame the math, and that there is no strong reason to prefer one framing over the other.
Actually, if I were to follow what seems to be your model, where people need to be repeatedly filled with status-giving gestures in order to merely maintain their current status position, then I would either have to have a model for how status deflation occurs, or else assume that everybody’s status is always increasing in the absence of any actions taken to decrease status. This seems incoherent to me, especially since it would imply that older people would nearly always have higher status than younger people, a correlation which doesn’t hold much past adulthood.
At this point, unless you clarify your model of status and what it is exactly that you think we differ on, I don’t see much point in continuing this thread. (Honestly, I’m not sure why you started it in the first place.)
The fact that she chose you as her partner, instead of other potential candidates, gives you some status (not relative to her, but relative to all other real or imaginary candidates). Could this play some role in your feelings from her smile?
A stranger thanking you for holding the door confirms that you belong to a set of polite people. Not everyone is in this set, and people in this set have higher status than people outside of the set.
You are right, a clear definition of status is necessary, otherwise pretty much anything can be “explained” by status. But I suspect that if a meaningful definition is made, it will allow transactions of type: person X is increasing status of person Y without decreasing their own status (by decreasing status of someone else, for example an unspecified absent person).
The “really” in that statement hides a lot of ambiguity. Here, the status assigned to you fails evolution’s consequentialist calculation, so one might say that evolution shouldn’t care what status strangers in a big city assign you. Your psychological adaptations might still care, in the sense that they get activated, not having recognized absence of evolution-relevant consequences.
On the other hand, the psychological drive may be seen as representing a terminal value, preference for accumulation of status for its own sake, irrespective of its effect on other people’s behavior or of the impact of their behavior on you. In that case, one may say that you should care. It would still be the case that you should care even if the relevant psychological adaptations don’t in fact activate, so that you happen to not care in the psychological sense.
Not really. ;-)
It specifically meant, “I don’t care as long as they don’t assign me low status”, i.e., threaten my status with their response. That’s not a lot of ambiguity.