If the two theories make the same predictions, what is the point? Why not just stick with the old fuddy duddy one reality?
For example, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics make the same predictions and are completely equivalent in most cases, but have different uses. There is nothing wrong with picking the formalism more convenient for a specific problem. Granted, MWI does not have a specific formalism, but I allow that it can still provide an inspiration or an intuition in certain problems, which then has to be checked by doing the calculations.
As for the reasons why EY considers the MWI advocacy being important to applied rationality, they are explained in the earlier reruns. Can’t say that I agree, but many regulars do, so more power to them.
As for the reasons why EY considers the MWI advocacy being important to applied rationality, they are explained in the earlier reruns. Can’t say that I agree, but many regulars do, so more power to them.
I don’t recall any regulars expressing agreement that MWI advocacy is important to applied rationality to the degree suggested by Eliezer. (It could have happened but it would look odd to me.)
Anyone bothering to try and determine whether this is true or not needs to know your definition of “regular.”
I would, for the purpose of that particular comment, cede the definition to shminux and outright declare that the claim he is making about “regulars”, whoever they may be, is wrong. He has confused endorsement of the QM sequence and rejection of Single World theories in general with the separate issue of agreement that it was as necessary to applied rationality as Eliezer said.
Come to think of it I don’t offhand recall anyone or anything ever having expressed such agreement. “Many” and “regulars” only become relevant in as much as I am more likely to have seen and paid attention to such claims if they existed and can thereby be more confident that shminux is simply making a false claim.
For example, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics make the same predictions and are completely equivalent in most cases, but have different uses. There is nothing wrong with picking the formalism more convenient for a specific problem. Granted, MWI does not have a specific formalism, but I allow that it can still provide an inspiration or an intuition in certain problems, which then has to be checked by doing the calculations.
As for the reasons why EY considers the MWI advocacy being important to applied rationality, they are explained in the earlier reruns. Can’t say that I agree, but many regulars do, so more power to them.
How gracious!
Can’t tell if this remark is sarcastic or serious...
I don’t recall any regulars expressing agreement that MWI advocacy is important to applied rationality to the degree suggested by Eliezer. (It could have happened but it would look odd to me.)
Anyone bothering to try and determine whether this is true or not needs to know your definition of “regular.”
I would, for the purpose of that particular comment, cede the definition to shminux and outright declare that the claim he is making about “regulars”, whoever they may be, is wrong. He has confused endorsement of the QM sequence and rejection of Single World theories in general with the separate issue of agreement that it was as necessary to applied rationality as Eliezer said.
Come to think of it I don’t offhand recall anyone or anything ever having expressed such agreement. “Many” and “regulars” only become relevant in as much as I am more likely to have seen and paid attention to such claims if they existed and can thereby be more confident that shminux is simply making a false claim.