If you can construct a certain line of reasoning about observed world using MWI, you should be able to do the same if you assume that only this single world “exists”.
If the two theories make the same predictions, what is the point? Why not just stick with the old fuddy duddy one reality? Is MWI just a fashion statement? Just a theory that falls under Quine’s “inscrutability of translation”?
Note that a hidden variable theory does make a prediction—that there are hidden variables we may one day discover and use to make better predictions than we can now, and do more powerful things, while theories that make randomness ontological say that we will absolutely never do that—the unpredictability and uncontrolability are inherent in reality.
I’m a fuddy duddy sticking with other fuddy duddies like Einstein (and I believe Jaynes) until the the detector efficiency and fair sampling loopholes are closed.
Would someone in the know tell me what the MWI supposedly buys? What’s the payoff? Even conceptually, ignoring the identical predictions, what’s the payoff? What problem does it supposedly solve? And then, what problems does it introduce that fuddy duddies don’t already have?
I don’t see that branching has gained me anything over wave function collapse—and now I have to deal with being killed by an asteroid strike last week in some parallel universe. Who needs it?
The positives I see are: wavefunctions being real, and not statistical statements about point objects; measurements are actually quantum interactions of joint wavefunctions.
My prescription for physics is to accept that (some) wave functions are real, they can interact in ways that we don’t currently understand (wave function collapse, branching, etc.) and let’s get on with doing some real physics and figuring out how they interact, how we can measure it, and how we can control it.
Physics seems awash in mathematical wanking that I explain through evolutionary theory. Measurements are expensive, and give a zillion uninteresting and unpublishable failures before an interesting publishable success. Mathematical wanking is cheap, and allows “successful” papers to be published, and phds to be had. Run a couple iterations of that, the measurers go extinct and the wankers have inherited the physics departments.
If the two theories make the same predictions, what is the point? Why not just stick with the old fuddy duddy one reality?
For example, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics make the same predictions and are completely equivalent in most cases, but have different uses. There is nothing wrong with picking the formalism more convenient for a specific problem. Granted, MWI does not have a specific formalism, but I allow that it can still provide an inspiration or an intuition in certain problems, which then has to be checked by doing the calculations.
As for the reasons why EY considers the MWI advocacy being important to applied rationality, they are explained in the earlier reruns. Can’t say that I agree, but many regulars do, so more power to them.
As for the reasons why EY considers the MWI advocacy being important to applied rationality, they are explained in the earlier reruns. Can’t say that I agree, but many regulars do, so more power to them.
I don’t recall any regulars expressing agreement that MWI advocacy is important to applied rationality to the degree suggested by Eliezer. (It could have happened but it would look odd to me.)
Anyone bothering to try and determine whether this is true or not needs to know your definition of “regular.”
I would, for the purpose of that particular comment, cede the definition to shminux and outright declare that the claim he is making about “regulars”, whoever they may be, is wrong. He has confused endorsement of the QM sequence and rejection of Single World theories in general with the separate issue of agreement that it was as necessary to applied rationality as Eliezer said.
Come to think of it I don’t offhand recall anyone or anything ever having expressed such agreement. “Many” and “regulars” only become relevant in as much as I am more likely to have seen and paid attention to such claims if they existed and can thereby be more confident that shminux is simply making a false claim.
If the two theories make the same predictions, what is the point? Why not just stick with the old fuddy duddy one reality? Is MWI just a fashion statement? Just a theory that falls under Quine’s “inscrutability of translation”?
Note that a hidden variable theory does make a prediction—that there are hidden variables we may one day discover and use to make better predictions than we can now, and do more powerful things, while theories that make randomness ontological say that we will absolutely never do that—the unpredictability and uncontrolability are inherent in reality.
I’m a fuddy duddy sticking with other fuddy duddies like Einstein (and I believe Jaynes) until the the detector efficiency and fair sampling loopholes are closed.
Would someone in the know tell me what the MWI supposedly buys? What’s the payoff? Even conceptually, ignoring the identical predictions, what’s the payoff? What problem does it supposedly solve? And then, what problems does it introduce that fuddy duddies don’t already have?
I don’t see that branching has gained me anything over wave function collapse—and now I have to deal with being killed by an asteroid strike last week in some parallel universe. Who needs it?
The positives I see are: wavefunctions being real, and not statistical statements about point objects; measurements are actually quantum interactions of joint wavefunctions.
My prescription for physics is to accept that (some) wave functions are real, they can interact in ways that we don’t currently understand (wave function collapse, branching, etc.) and let’s get on with doing some real physics and figuring out how they interact, how we can measure it, and how we can control it.
Physics seems awash in mathematical wanking that I explain through evolutionary theory. Measurements are expensive, and give a zillion uninteresting and unpublishable failures before an interesting publishable success. Mathematical wanking is cheap, and allows “successful” papers to be published, and phds to be had. Run a couple iterations of that, the measurers go extinct and the wankers have inherited the physics departments.
I stick with Max Planck instead:
Every funeral is a change, but not every change is an advance.
Now get offa my lawn.
For example, Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics make the same predictions and are completely equivalent in most cases, but have different uses. There is nothing wrong with picking the formalism more convenient for a specific problem. Granted, MWI does not have a specific formalism, but I allow that it can still provide an inspiration or an intuition in certain problems, which then has to be checked by doing the calculations.
As for the reasons why EY considers the MWI advocacy being important to applied rationality, they are explained in the earlier reruns. Can’t say that I agree, but many regulars do, so more power to them.
How gracious!
Can’t tell if this remark is sarcastic or serious...
I don’t recall any regulars expressing agreement that MWI advocacy is important to applied rationality to the degree suggested by Eliezer. (It could have happened but it would look odd to me.)
Anyone bothering to try and determine whether this is true or not needs to know your definition of “regular.”
I would, for the purpose of that particular comment, cede the definition to shminux and outright declare that the claim he is making about “regulars”, whoever they may be, is wrong. He has confused endorsement of the QM sequence and rejection of Single World theories in general with the separate issue of agreement that it was as necessary to applied rationality as Eliezer said.
Come to think of it I don’t offhand recall anyone or anything ever having expressed such agreement. “Many” and “regulars” only become relevant in as much as I am more likely to have seen and paid attention to such claims if they existed and can thereby be more confident that shminux is simply making a false claim.