Reading this, I am truly baffled by how underinformed/misinformed Americans (even in the rationalist community) were on eastern Europe. Analysts from central and eastern Europe have now for some time been pointing out that A) Ukrainian military in 2022 is on a whole different level than in 2014. Since the annexation of Crimea and start of civil war in Donbass, Ukrainians were expecting they will have to face Russians directly sooner or later and with the help of NATO have beefed-up it’s military significantly. On the other hand the Russian military is based on their age-old (and often successful) “nas mnogo” (“there’s a lot of us”) strategy. It’s direct investment into technology was squeezed in past years by western sanctions and general downfall of Russian economy and because their own bias about their military might it was not prioritised. The military does have some pretty neat machines and weapons, but they seriously lack in logistics, rendering their deployment slow and less effective. The consensus was that while Russian army clearly is bigger and stronger, the Ukrainian army will likely give them a really hard time.
I recommend recent, criminally underrated videos by Adam Something on this conflict. For those who prefer reading, Anne Applebaum is an amazing source on Russian geopolitics, Peter Pomerantsev is great source on the inner workings of their propaganda machine.
A lot of the Ukrainians and Russians I’ve spoken with online also have seemed surprised at how well the Ukrainian army has been holding up, so I’m not sure it’s that baffling.
Our track record in recent memory for “supplying weapons and training will make this country/government able to defend itself” is not great; Afghanistan in particular seemed to be seeking a world record on how quick they could fall apart and how limp a defense could be. It’s a pleasant surprise to actually be seeing results in Ukraine. One could argue that’s not the best comparision to make, but it’s undeniably the most salient.
Pakistan supplied weapons and safe havens to the Afghan insurgency. It worked extremely well.
I assume by “Our” you mean the United States? Russia invaded Afghanistan within living memory too. The United States supplied the Afghan mujahideen with weapons to fight the Soviet Union in the Soviet–Afghan War. I think Operation Cyclone is a better comparison to make than the 2001-2021 War in Afghanistan because the United States was on the side of the insurgents (and opposed to the invader-installed government) in the Soviet–Afghan War.
I was mostly responding to the implied “Why did Americans (and possibly people from other NATO countries) have such a bad prediction miss about how the conflict would play out.” I think I agree with everything you wrote above—in particular the invader-installed government seems to be an important distinction, and in a way that casually following world events from the US perspective would not lead one to realize.
Reading this, I am truly baffled by how underinformed/misinformed Americans (even in the rationalist community) were on eastern Europe. Analysts from central and eastern Europe have now for some time been pointing out that A) Ukrainian military in 2022 is on a whole different level than in 2014. Since the annexation of Crimea and start of civil war in Donbass, Ukrainians were expecting they will have to face Russians directly sooner or later and with the help of NATO have beefed-up it’s military significantly. On the other hand the Russian military is based on their age-old (and often successful) “nas mnogo” (“there’s a lot of us”) strategy. It’s direct investment into technology was squeezed in past years by western sanctions and general downfall of Russian economy and because their own bias about their military might it was not prioritised. The military does have some pretty neat machines and weapons, but they seriously lack in logistics, rendering their deployment slow and less effective. The consensus was that while Russian army clearly is bigger and stronger, the Ukrainian army will likely give them a really hard time.
I recommend recent, criminally underrated videos by Adam Something on this conflict. For those who prefer reading, Anne Applebaum is an amazing source on Russian geopolitics, Peter Pomerantsev is great source on the inner workings of their propaganda machine.
A lot of the Ukrainians and Russians I’ve spoken with online also have seemed surprised at how well the Ukrainian army has been holding up, so I’m not sure it’s that baffling.
Swap out “Ukrainian military” for “Afghan government” and you’ll see how it wasn’t obvious that Ukraine would put up resistance at all.
Our track record in recent memory for “supplying weapons and training will make this country/government able to defend itself” is not great; Afghanistan in particular seemed to be seeking a world record on how quick they could fall apart and how limp a defense could be. It’s a pleasant surprise to actually be seeing results in Ukraine. One could argue that’s not the best comparision to make, but it’s undeniably the most salient.
Pakistan supplied weapons and safe havens to the Afghan insurgency. It worked extremely well.
I assume by “Our” you mean the United States? Russia invaded Afghanistan within living memory too. The United States supplied the Afghan mujahideen with weapons to fight the Soviet Union in the Soviet–Afghan War. I think Operation Cyclone is a better comparison to make than the 2001-2021 War in Afghanistan because the United States was on the side of the insurgents (and opposed to the invader-installed government) in the Soviet–Afghan War.
I was mostly responding to the implied “Why did Americans (and possibly people from other NATO countries) have such a bad prediction miss about how the conflict would play out.” I think I agree with everything you wrote above—in particular the invader-installed government seems to be an important distinction, and in a way that casually following world events from the US perspective would not lead one to realize.