You are committing the general error of prematurely declaring a question “dissolved”. It’s always better to err in the other direction. That’s how I come up with all my weird models, anyway.
I just took a little walk outside and this clarification occurred to me: imagine an algorithm (Turing machine) running on a classical physical computer, sitting on a table in our quantum universe. The computer has the interesting property that it is “stable” under the Born rule: a weighted-majority of near futures ranked by the 2-norm have the computer correctly executing the next few steps of the computation, but for the 1-norm this isn’t necessarily the case—the computer will likely glitch or self-destruct. (All computers built by humans probably have this property. Also note that it can be defined in terms of the wavefunction alone, without assuming weights a priori.) Then the algorithm will have “subjective anticipation” of a weird kind: conditioned on the algorithm itself running faithfully in the future, it can conclude that future histories with higher Born-weight are more likely.
This idea has the drawback that it doesn’t look at histories of the outside world, only the computer’s internals. But maybe it can be extended to include observations somehow?
You are committing the general error of prematurely declaring the question “dissolved”. It’s always better to err in the other direction.
“Beginning to feel” that the question is dissolved is far from the level of certainty required to “declare it dissolved”, merely a hunch that it’s the right direction to look for the answer (not that it’s a question I’m especially interested in, but it might be useful to understand it better).
I agree with your description in the second paragraph, but don’t clearly see what you wanted to communicate through it. (Closest salient idea is Hanson’s “mingled worlds”.)
You are committing the general error of prematurely declaring a question “dissolved”. It’s always better to err in the other direction. That’s how I come up with all my weird models, anyway.
I just took a little walk outside and this clarification occurred to me: imagine an algorithm (Turing machine) running on a classical physical computer, sitting on a table in our quantum universe. The computer has the interesting property that it is “stable” under the Born rule: a weighted-majority of near futures ranked by the 2-norm have the computer correctly executing the next few steps of the computation, but for the 1-norm this isn’t necessarily the case—the computer will likely glitch or self-destruct. (All computers built by humans probably have this property. Also note that it can be defined in terms of the wavefunction alone, without assuming weights a priori.) Then the algorithm will have “subjective anticipation” of a weird kind: conditioned on the algorithm itself running faithfully in the future, it can conclude that future histories with higher Born-weight are more likely.
This idea has the drawback that it doesn’t look at histories of the outside world, only the computer’s internals. But maybe it can be extended to include observations somehow?
“Beginning to feel” that the question is dissolved is far from the level of certainty required to “declare it dissolved”, merely a hunch that it’s the right direction to look for the answer (not that it’s a question I’m especially interested in, but it might be useful to understand it better).
I agree with your description in the second paragraph, but don’t clearly see what you wanted to communicate through it. (Closest salient idea is Hanson’s “mingled worlds”.)