Consequentialism should guarantee the best (expected) outcomes for the consequentialist. That’s the whole point. If Hammond’s version doesn’t do that, then it seems like a bad version.
I think being left in the desert is the best and only outcome if the driver only takes me to town if they are certain I will pay them there.
Let’s assume the driver will drive you if they predict you’re at least 80% likely to pay. Maybe you can’t fully guarantee a ride, but you can increase the probability by at least temporarily modifying how you make decisions, e.g. by caring more about keeping promises.
I do not understand why this poses a problem to consequentialist reasoning. If I want to maximise my chances of survival, I should just constrain myself as much as possible to pay the driver in town. I would most likely be wrong if I found myself in town thinking there is only 10 % chance of paying if the driver is calibrated. I could try not to pay, but I would end up paying 80 % of the time. Reliably not paying would not be a live option if the driver is calibrated?
I think being left in the desert is the best and only outcome if the driver only takes me to town if they are certain I will pay them there.
I do not understand why this poses a problem to consequentialist reasoning. If I want to maximise my chances of survival, I should just constrain myself as much as possible to pay the driver in town. I would most likely be wrong if I found myself in town thinking there is only 10 % chance of paying if the driver is calibrated. I could try not to pay, but I would end up paying 80 % of the time. Reliably not paying would not be a live option if the driver is calibrated?