I’m noticing evidence that many of us may have an inaccurate view of the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm. I say this after reading “Did Stanislav Petrov save the world in 1983? It’s complicated”. The article is worth reading; it is a clear and detailed ~1100 words. I’ve included some excerpts here:
[...] I must say right away that there is absolutely no reason to doubt Petrov’s account of the events. Also, there is no doubt that Stanislav Petrov did the right thing when he reported up the chain of command that in his assessment the alarm was false. That was a good call in stressful circumstances and Petrov fully deserves the praise for making it.
But did he literally avert a nuclear war and saved the world? In my view, that was not quite what happened. (I would note that as far as I know Petrov himself never claimed that he did.)
To begin with, one assumption that is absolutely critical for the “saved the world” version of the events is that the Soviet Union maintained the so-called launch-on-warning posture. This would mean that it was prepared to launch its missiles as soon as its early-warning system detects a missile attack. This is how US system works and, as it usually happens, most people automatically assume that everybody does the same. Or at least tries to. This assumption is, of course, wrong. The Soviet Union structured its strategic forces to absorb a nuclear attack and focused on assuring retaliation—the posture known as “deep second strike” (“ответный удар”). The idea was that some missiles (and submarines) will survive an attack and will be launched in retaliation once it is over.
[...] the Soviet Union would have waited for actual nuclear detonations on its soil. Nobody would have launched anything based on an alarm generated by the early-warning system, let alone by only one of its segments—the satellites.
[...] It is certain that the alarm would have been recognized as false at some stages. But even if it wasn’t, the most radical thing the General Staff (with the involvement of the political leadership) would do was to issue a preliminary command. No missiles would be launched unless the system detected actual nuclear detonations on the Soviet territory.
Having said that, what Stanislav Petrov did was indeed commendable. The algorithm that generated the alarm got it wrong. The designers of the early-warning satellites took particular pride in the fact that the assessment is done by computers rather than by humans. So, it definitely took courage to make that call to the command center up the chain of command and insist that the alarm is false. We simply don’t know what would have happened if he kept silence or confirmed the alarm as positive. And, importantly, he did not know it either. He just did all he could to prevent the worst from happening.
I haven’t made a thorough assessment myself. For now, I’m adding The Dead Hand to my reading list.
Edited on 2025-12-25 to improve clarity of the first point. Thanks to readers for the feedback.
Feedback: I had to read your first sentence like 3x until I understood you meant “based on reading this, I think many of us had an inaccurate view previously”) instead of “I think many of us have an inaccurate view from reading this”.
Sorry for the confusion. :P … I do appreciate the feedback. Edited to say: “I’m noticing evidence that many of us may have an inaccurate view of the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm. I say this after reading...”
I was always slightly suspicious of the claims that we had x (5 or so?) times been closer to entering the big nuclear war than to not entering it. But if this passage is accurate, then the fact that some of the usual claims are so easy to put into perspective would suggest in some communities we are also a bit more affected by sensationalism than I’d have thought. Interesting, thanks!
do we have strong reasons to believe the US early detection system was much less likely to have a similar false alarm? if not, then the Petrov incident should count somewhat as a near miss.
I’m noticing evidence that many of us may have an inaccurate view of the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm. I say this after reading “Did Stanislav Petrov save the world in 1983? It’s complicated”. The article is worth reading; it is a clear and detailed ~1100 words. I’ve included some excerpts here:
I haven’t made a thorough assessment myself. For now, I’m adding The Dead Hand to my reading list.
Edited on 2025-12-25 to improve clarity of the first point. Thanks to readers for the feedback.
Feedback: I had to read your first sentence like 3x until I understood you meant “based on reading this, I think many of us had an inaccurate view previously”) instead of “I think many of us have an inaccurate view from reading this”.
I also had this initial misreading, but I think I figured out what you meant on my first reread.
Sorry for the confusion. :P … I do appreciate the feedback. Edited to say: “I’m noticing evidence that many of us may have an inaccurate view of the 1983 Soviet nuclear false alarm. I say this after reading...”
I was always slightly suspicious of the claims that we had x (5 or so?) times been closer to entering the big nuclear war than to not entering it. But if this passage is accurate, then the fact that some of the usual claims are so easy to put into perspective would suggest in some communities we are also a bit more affected by sensationalism than I’d have thought. Interesting, thanks!
do we have strong reasons to believe the US early detection system was much less likely to have a similar false alarm? if not, then the Petrov incident should count somewhat as a near miss.