if it affects how they interpret evidence, it’s a bias, if it affects just their decisions it’s a preference.
The problem is that in practice assigning mental states to one or the other of these categories can get rather arbitrary. Especially when aliefs get involved.
I didn’t say it’s how you determine which is which in practice, I said (or meant to) it’s what I think each means. (Admittedly this isn’t the answer to Jayson’s question, but I wasn’t answering to that. I didn’t mean to say that everything that affects decisions is a preference, I just realized it might be interpreted that way, but obviously not everything that affects how you interpret evidence is a bias, either.)
I’m not sure I understand what you mean about aliefs. I thought the point of aliefs is that they’re not beliefs. E.g., if I alieve that I’m in danger because there’s a scary monster on TV, then my beliefs are still accurate (I know that I’m not in danger), and if my pulse raises or I scream or something, that’s neither bias nor preference, it’s involuntary.
The tricky part is if I want (preference) to go to sleep later, but I don’t because I’m too scared to turn off the light, even though I know there aren’t monsters in the closet. I’m not sure what that’s called, but I’m not sure I’d call it a bias (unless maybe I don’t notice I’m scared and it influences my beliefs) nor a preference (unless maybe I decide not to go to sleep right now because I’d rather not have bad dreams). But it doesn’t have to be a dichotomy, so I have no problem assigning this case to a third (unnamed) category.
Do you have an example of alief involvement that’s more ambiguous? I’m not sure if you mean “arbitrary” in practice or in theory or both.
Look, if (hypothetically) I can’t go to sleep because my head hurts when I lie down, that’s neither a bias nor a preference. Why is it different if the reason is fear and I know the fear is not justified? They’re both physiological reactions. Why do I have to classify one in the bias/preference dichotomy and not the other?
The problem is that in practice assigning mental states to one or the other of these categories can get rather arbitrary. Especially when aliefs get involved.
I didn’t say it’s how you determine which is which in practice, I said (or meant to) it’s what I think each means. (Admittedly this isn’t the answer to Jayson’s question, but I wasn’t answering to that. I didn’t mean to say that everything that affects decisions is a preference, I just realized it might be interpreted that way, but obviously not everything that affects how you interpret evidence is a bias, either.)
I’m not sure I understand what you mean about aliefs. I thought the point of aliefs is that they’re not beliefs. E.g., if I alieve that I’m in danger because there’s a scary monster on TV, then my beliefs are still accurate (I know that I’m not in danger), and if my pulse raises or I scream or something, that’s neither bias nor preference, it’s involuntary.
The tricky part is if I want (preference) to go to sleep later, but I don’t because I’m too scared to turn off the light, even though I know there aren’t monsters in the closet. I’m not sure what that’s called, but I’m not sure I’d call it a bias (unless maybe I don’t notice I’m scared and it influences my beliefs) nor a preference (unless maybe I decide not to go to sleep right now because I’d rather not have bad dreams). But it doesn’t have to be a dichotomy, so I have no problem assigning this case to a third (unnamed) category.
Do you have an example of alief involvement that’s more ambiguous? I’m not sure if you mean “arbitrary” in practice or in theory or both.
Yes it does because you ultimately have to choose one or the other.
Look, if (hypothetically) I can’t go to sleep because my head hurts when I lie down, that’s neither a bias nor a preference. Why is it different if the reason is fear and I know the fear is not justified? They’re both physiological reactions. Why do I have to classify one in the bias/preference dichotomy and not the other?