From my point of view, other people have some extra thing on top of their sensations, which produces philosophical conundrums when they try to think about it.
As someone who definitely has qualia (and believes that you do too), no, that’s not what’s going on. There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior—namely, sensations. There would be no confusion if the world were coupled differential equations all the way down (and not just because there would be no one home to be confused), but instead we’re something that acts like a collection of coupled differential equations but also, unlike abstract mathematical structures, is like something to be.
“There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior, namely sensations.” Wow, that’s a fascinating notion. But presumably if we didn’t have visual sensations, we’d be blind, assuming the rest of our brain worked the same, right? So what exactly requires explanation? You’re postulating something that acts just like me but has no sensations, I.e. is blind, deaf, etc. I don’t see how that can be a coherent thing you’re imagining.
When I read you saying “is like something to be,” I get the same feeling I get when someone tries to tell me what qualia are— it’s a peculiar collection of familiar words. It seems to me that you’re trying to turn a two-place predicate “A imagines what it feels like to be B” into a one-place predicate “B is like something to be”, where it’s a pure property of B.
Wow, that’s a fascinating notion. But presumably if we didn’t have visual sensations, we’d be blind, assuming the rest of our brain worked the same, right?
If you lacked information about your environment, you would be functionally impaired. Information about your environment doesn’t have to be visual...it could be sonar or something. It doesn’t have to be sensory either...you could just somehow know that there is a door ahead of you ,and a turning to the left. Presumably , that’s how Dennett thinks it works.
I get the same feeling I get when someone tries to tell me what qualia are— it’s a peculiar collection of familiar words
“Time and space are, and they can bend and warp” is a peculiar combination of familiar words.
As someone who definitely has qualia (and believes that you do too), no, that’s not what’s going on. There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior—namely, sensations. There would be no confusion if the world were coupled differential equations all the way down (and not just because there would be no one home to be confused), but instead we’re something that acts like a collection of coupled differential equations but also, unlike abstract mathematical structures, is like something to be.
“There’s some confusing extra thing on top of behavior, namely sensations.” Wow, that’s a fascinating notion. But presumably if we didn’t have visual sensations, we’d be blind, assuming the rest of our brain worked the same, right? So what exactly requires explanation? You’re postulating something that acts just like me but has no sensations, I.e. is blind, deaf, etc. I don’t see how that can be a coherent thing you’re imagining.
When I read you saying “is like something to be,” I get the same feeling I get when someone tries to tell me what qualia are— it’s a peculiar collection of familiar words. It seems to me that you’re trying to turn a two-place predicate “A imagines what it feels like to be B” into a one-place predicate “B is like something to be”, where it’s a pure property of B.
If you lacked information about your environment, you would be functionally impaired. Information about your environment doesn’t have to be visual...it could be sonar or something. It doesn’t have to be sensory either...you could just somehow know that there is a door ahead of you ,and a turning to the left. Presumably , that’s how Dennett thinks it works.
“Time and space are, and they can bend and warp” is a peculiar combination of familiar words.