They wouldn’t strictly be p-zombies, because by definition, p-zombies display behaviour indistinguishable from non-zombies. Instead, Camp 1 people notably talk about consciousness differently from Camp 2 — as one would expect if they have different experiences of their own consciousness, or none at all.
So Camp 1 are just ordinary zombies.
ETA: It’s not just you and me. Some actual psychologists have speculated that grand psychological theories are nothing more than accounts of their creators’ subjective experiences of themselves. Radical behaviourists are the ones without such experience. I don’t have easily findable references, but I just found a mention of this book, whose title is suggestive: “Psychology’s Grand Theorists
How Personal Experiences Shaped Professional Ideas”.
Wait a second! I think you are onto something. What if it’s Camp 2 people who are p-zombies? Lacking the ability to experience things but pretending that they do, they overcompensate with singing dithyrambs to qualia and subjective experience, proclaiming its obvious fundamentality due to how awesome the experience alledgedly is!
While regular people who have consciousness, notice that while it’s curious and an obvious starting point for epistemology, after some amount of evidence it becomes very likely that the same material laws that works for everything else works for consciousness as well and that it will be eventually explained by matter interactions.
This probably isn’t the case, but I secretly wonder if the people in camp #1 are p-zombies.
They wouldn’t strictly be p-zombies, because by definition, p-zombies display behaviour indistinguishable from non-zombies. Instead, Camp 1 people notably talk about consciousness differently from Camp 2 — as one would expect if they have different experiences of their own consciousness, or none at all.
So Camp 1 are just ordinary zombies.
ETA: It’s not just you and me. Some actual psychologists have speculated that grand psychological theories are nothing more than accounts of their creators’ subjective experiences of themselves. Radical behaviourists are the ones without such experience. I don’t have easily findable references, but I just found a mention of this book, whose title is suggestive: “Psychology’s Grand Theorists How Personal Experiences Shaped Professional Ideas”.
Wait a second! I think you are onto something. What if it’s Camp 2 people who are p-zombies? Lacking the ability to experience things but pretending that they do, they overcompensate with singing dithyrambs to qualia and subjective experience, proclaiming its obvious fundamentality due to how awesome the experience alledgedly is!
While regular people who have consciousness, notice that while it’s curious and an obvious starting point for epistemology, after some amount of evidence it becomes very likely that the same material laws that works for everything else works for consciousness as well and that it will be eventually explained by matter interactions.
Joking, of course.
See this comment and my ongoing discussion with Carl Feynman.