The existence of people without qualia might be a way to displace the question from philosophy to cognitive psychology,
There are both philosophical (What are qualia? What having/not having qualia implies?) and neuroscientific (How exactly the closest referent to “qualia” actually works?) aspects to the problem. Both require an answer. Substituting one for another won’t do. The issue with the philosophical aspect isn’t that we can’t get an answer. It’s that we get too many, incompatible with each other answers and it’s hard to use definitions consistently in such situation.
I agree that there may be fascinating additional data in the realm of neurosciency. I wouldn’t be much surprised if some people indeed have much more impressive subjective experiences than others. It’s legitimate to talk about it as a possibility, and yet it’s only tangental to the philosophical questions at hand.
I don’t think I have qualia, but I’m sure other people do. They’ve claimed to on many occasions, and I don’t think they’re lying or deceived.
As you may see from the comments these people also claim that you misunderstand them with such interpretaton. I don’t think they are lying either.
You tell me! People say qualia are the most obvious thing in the world. Do you feel like you have them?
See my reply to GeorgeWilfrid and his original comment. I have qualia defined the way he did and I expect you to have them too. Let’s call it weak qualia (wq). On the other hand, if qualia are defined as irreducible and non-physical—hard qualia (hq) - then I believe that I don’t have them, nor that I had them in my subjective idealist days and I don’t think anyone does no matter how awesome their subjective experience is.
The problem, however, that there is mob and bailey dynamics going on. Some people confuse wq with hq, some people think that wq imply hq. People that think they have hq often use the same language that people who think they have only wq. People arguing past each other often use different definitions. And so on.
When we’ve fixed the definitions. I believe we can properly solve the philosophical aspect. The question is reduced to whether wq indeed imply hq. I think the argument for works like that (if there is someone who holds wq->hq position here, please correct me):
I have direct access to experience. My experience is different from matter. Thus the fact that I have experience at all means that it’s not material.
The mistake her is in failure to account for map-territoiry destinction. What if you have direct access only to your experience of experience and not experience itself? Then
My experience of experience is different from my experience of matter. Which doesn’t necessary means that experience is not material only that I feel this way even if it’s not true.
There are both philosophical (What are qualia? What having/not having qualia implies?) and neuroscientific (How exactly the closest referent to “qualia” actually works?) aspects to the problem. Both require an answer. Substituting one for another won’t do. The issue with the philosophical aspect isn’t that we can’t get an answer. It’s that we get too many, incompatible with each other answers and it’s hard to use definitions consistently in such situation.
I agree that there may be fascinating additional data in the realm of neurosciency. I wouldn’t be much surprised if some people indeed have much more impressive subjective experiences than others. It’s legitimate to talk about it as a possibility, and yet it’s only tangental to the philosophical questions at hand.
As you may see from the comments these people also claim that you misunderstand them with such interpretaton. I don’t think they are lying either.
See my reply to GeorgeWilfrid and his original comment. I have qualia defined the way he did and I expect you to have them too. Let’s call it weak qualia (wq). On the other hand, if qualia are defined as irreducible and non-physical—hard qualia (hq) - then I believe that I don’t have them, nor that I had them in my subjective idealist days and I don’t think anyone does no matter how awesome their subjective experience is.
The problem, however, that there is mob and bailey dynamics going on. Some people confuse wq with hq, some people think that wq imply hq. People that think they have hq often use the same language that people who think they have only wq. People arguing past each other often use different definitions. And so on.
When we’ve fixed the definitions. I believe we can properly solve the philosophical aspect. The question is reduced to whether wq indeed imply hq. I think the argument for works like that (if there is someone who holds wq->hq position here, please correct me):
The mistake her is in failure to account for map-territoiry destinction. What if you have direct access only to your experience of experience and not experience itself? Then