May I ask you some questions about your Camp #1 intutions (since I have pretty strong Camp #2 intuitions)?
As I see it, the really interesting qualia are not things like redness. The really interesting qualia are the ability to experience enjoyment and suffering.
I hope it is obvious that there exist some things that are able to suffer and enjoy—for example, humans. (And there probably exist other things which cannot.) Likewise, there exist things which can process information and act on it by moving their bodies and manipulating their environment. (This includes most-if-not-all animals as well as many machines.)
What is the relationship between the ability to process information and the abilities to suffer and enjoy?
That is of course a broad and vague question, so let me ask a more specific one.
Humans are able to enjoy eating food and resting. It is reasonable to surmise that some animals likewise enjoy eating and resting (perhaps even all animals).
Now consider a lawn mower robot which is programmed to notice when its battery is running low and return to its charging station to “eat and rest”. Does the robot enjoy charging? Why or why not?
With the lawn mower robot, we are able to say what portions of its construction and software are responsible for its charging-station-seeking behavior, in a well-understood mechanistic way. Presumably, if we knew more about the construction of the human mind, we’d be able to describe the mechanisms responsible for human enjoyment of eating and resting. Are the two mechanisms similar enough that it makes sense to refer to the robot enjoying things? I think that the answer is (a) we don’t know, (b) probably not, and (c) there is no fact of the matter that will allow us to settle the question. It’s just a question of whether two things, more or less similar, should be lumped into the same category. On the other hand, thinking of my dogs as enjoying eating and resting is pretty clearly sensible, because it seems to predict their behavior well, and because the mechanisms involved are probably quite similar in the two species.
I don’t think enjoyment and suffering are arbitrary or unimportant. But I do think they’re nebulous. They don’t have crisp, definable, generally agreed-upon properties. We have to deal with them anyway.
I don’t reason about animal ethics; I just follow standard American cultural standards. And I think ethics matters because it helps us live a virtuous and rewarding life.
You would suppose wrong! My wife and I belong to a group of a couple of dozen people that investigates charities, picks the best ones, and sends them big checks. I used to participate more, but now I outsource all the effort to my wife. I wasn’t contributing much to the choosing process. I just earn the money 🙂.
What does this have to do with my camp#1 intuitions?
Now I am confused. Do you care about animal ethics as part of your commitment to effective altruism? If so, how can you do that without reasoning about it? Or do you just ignore the animals?
My charity extends no further than the human race. Once in a while I think about animal ethics and decide that no, I still don’t care enough to make an effort.
A basic commitment of my charity group from the beginning: no money that benefits things other than people. We don’t donate to benefit political groups, organizations, arts, animals, or the natural world. I’m good with that. Members of the group may of course donate elsewhere, and generally do.
We’ve been doing this since 1998, decades before Effective Altruism was a thing. I don’t have a commitment to Effective Altruism the movement, just to altruism which is effective.
May I ask you some questions about your Camp #1 intutions (since I have pretty strong Camp #2 intuitions)?
As I see it, the really interesting qualia are not things like redness. The really interesting qualia are the ability to experience enjoyment and suffering.
I hope it is obvious that there exist some things that are able to suffer and enjoy—for example, humans. (And there probably exist other things which cannot.) Likewise, there exist things which can process information and act on it by moving their bodies and manipulating their environment. (This includes most-if-not-all animals as well as many machines.)
What is the relationship between the ability to process information and the abilities to suffer and enjoy?
That is of course a broad and vague question, so let me ask a more specific one.
Humans are able to enjoy eating food and resting. It is reasonable to surmise that some animals likewise enjoy eating and resting (perhaps even all animals).
Now consider a lawn mower robot which is programmed to notice when its battery is running low and return to its charging station to “eat and rest”. Does the robot enjoy charging? Why or why not?
With the lawn mower robot, we are able to say what portions of its construction and software are responsible for its charging-station-seeking behavior, in a well-understood mechanistic way. Presumably, if we knew more about the construction of the human mind, we’d be able to describe the mechanisms responsible for human enjoyment of eating and resting. Are the two mechanisms similar enough that it makes sense to refer to the robot enjoying things? I think that the answer is (a) we don’t know, (b) probably not, and (c) there is no fact of the matter that will allow us to settle the question. It’s just a question of whether two things, more or less similar, should be lumped into the same category. On the other hand, thinking of my dogs as enjoying eating and resting is pretty clearly sensible, because it seems to predict their behavior well, and because the mechanisms involved are probably quite similar in the two species.
Thanks for the response.
You make it sound as though enjoyment and suffering are just arbitrary and unimportant shorthands to describe certain mechanistic processes.
From that perspective, how do you reason about animal ethics? For that matter, why does any ethics matter at all?
I don’t think enjoyment and suffering are arbitrary or unimportant. But I do think they’re nebulous. They don’t have crisp, definable, generally agreed-upon properties. We have to deal with them anyway.
I don’t reason about animal ethics; I just follow standard American cultural standards. And I think ethics matters because it helps us live a virtuous and rewarding life.
Is that helpful?
Thanks for the response.
I suppose you do not have any interest in effective altruism either?
You would suppose wrong! My wife and I belong to a group of a couple of dozen people that investigates charities, picks the best ones, and sends them big checks. I used to participate more, but now I outsource all the effort to my wife. I wasn’t contributing much to the choosing process. I just earn the money 🙂.
What does this have to do with my camp#1 intuitions?
Now I am confused. Do you care about animal ethics as part of your commitment to effective altruism? If so, how can you do that without reasoning about it? Or do you just ignore the animals?
My charity extends no further than the human race. Once in a while I think about animal ethics and decide that no, I still don’t care enough to make an effort.
A basic commitment of my charity group from the beginning: no money that benefits things other than people. We don’t donate to benefit political groups, organizations, arts, animals, or the natural world. I’m good with that. Members of the group may of course donate elsewhere, and generally do.
We’ve been doing this since 1998, decades before Effective Altruism was a thing. I don’t have a commitment to Effective Altruism the movement, just to altruism which is effective.