While, the weighers are uniquely interested in making this fair and regular. They’ll try earnestly to come up with a procedure for making these decisions from an omnibenevolent perspective, and also in a way that’s predictable for VGs!
Why would they be uniquely interested in that? How do you incentivize them for that?
Internal legibility, rules, and democratic pressure. These incentives are good enough for some kinds of work.
They are not good enough for project prioritization and entrepreneurship, which can’t be (reliably) internally legible, which follow no regular patterns that fixed rules can accommodate, and judging them takes lots of time and specialist knowledge. So we end up needing this special qualitative post-hoc accountability mechanism that is more suited to them.
But not everything requires that sort of mechanism.
What I think I might have done here is separated the work of public goods funding into two departments that run under different incentive systems, each suited to the job they’re assigned.
Why would they be uniquely interested in that? How do you incentivize them for that?
Internal legibility, rules, and democratic pressure. These incentives are good enough for some kinds of work.
They are not good enough for project prioritization and entrepreneurship, which can’t be (reliably) internally legible, which follow no regular patterns that fixed rules can accommodate, and judging them takes lots of time and specialist knowledge. So we end up needing this special qualitative post-hoc accountability mechanism that is more suited to them.
But not everything requires that sort of mechanism.
What I think I might have done here is separated the work of public goods funding into two departments that run under different incentive systems, each suited to the job they’re assigned.