I’d qualify the argument to say that high-status individuals can only lose local short-term status when subjected to new performance metrics. Locally high status but globally moderate status people have room to grow from performance metrics, if those metrics either strengthen the performance or prestige of their home institution.
A high status doctor at an underrated hospital can gain status relative to the global medical community if new performance metrics boost the hospital’s prestige.
A high status worker within an underrated company can gain higher-status employment if new performance metrics let them compensate for their low-prestige CV.
A major party asymetrically hampered by third party voters can improve its odds of victory by enacting approval voting, since it’s more likely to fix their spoiler candidate problem than it is to let the third party win.
Μy guess is that resistance to metrics is about a preference for social harmony, resistance to Goodharting, and loss aversion, more than a shortsighted conspiracy in favor of complacency by the chief. In a monopolar metricized status hierarchy, there’s only one way to be a winner. When we decide how to allocate status qualitatively, everybody can be the best at something, even if it’s just by being the only competitor in their chosen game.
I’d qualify the argument to say that high-status individuals can only lose local short-term status when subjected to new performance metrics. Locally high status but globally moderate status people have room to grow from performance metrics, if those metrics either strengthen the performance or prestige of their home institution.
A high status doctor at an underrated hospital can gain status relative to the global medical community if new performance metrics boost the hospital’s prestige.
A high status worker within an underrated company can gain higher-status employment if new performance metrics let them compensate for their low-prestige CV.
A major party asymetrically hampered by third party voters can improve its odds of victory by enacting approval voting, since it’s more likely to fix their spoiler candidate problem than it is to let the third party win.
Μy guess is that resistance to metrics is about a preference for social harmony, resistance to Goodharting, and loss aversion, more than a shortsighted conspiracy in favor of complacency by the chief. In a monopolar metricized status hierarchy, there’s only one way to be a winner. When we decide how to allocate status qualitatively, everybody can be the best at something, even if it’s just by being the only competitor in their chosen game.