There are natural categories, like “tigers”, that don’t require much of a mind to define. It’s not mind projection fallacy to say that something is a tiger.
P.S. I’m correcting self-censoring threshold, so expect silence where before I’d say something for the fifth time.
There are natural categories, like “tigers”, that don’t require much of a mind to define. It’s not mind projection fallacy to say that something is a tiger.
Is that actually an argument? ’cause it sounds like a random sentence injected into the conversation, perhaps as an invitation for me to waste time tearing “natural categories” to shreds, while leaving you still able to deny that your statement actually relates in any substantial way to your point… thereby once again relieving you of any need to actually defend your position.
That is, are you actually claiming aboutness to be a natural category? Or just trying to get me to treat your argument as if you were doing so?
P.S. I’m correcting self-censoring threshold, so expect silence
I already did and do expect it; see my “prediction” in the parent to your comment. I predicted that you would remain silent on any substantive issues, and avoid admitting anywhere where you were mistaken or incorrect. (I notice, for example, that you went back and deleted the comment where you said I was using “mind projection fallacy” incorrectly, rather than admit your attack was in error.)
And, as predicted, you avoided directly addressing the actual point of contention, instead choosing to enter a new piece of handwaving to imply that I am doing something else wrong.
That is, you appear to now be implying that I am using an overbroad definition of the MPF, without actually saying that I am doing it, or that your statement is in any way connected to your own position. This is a nice double bind, since either way I interpret the statement, you can retreat… and throw in more irrelevancies.
I don’t know if “troll” is a natural category, but you’re sure getting close to where I’d mind-project your behavior as matching that of one. ;-)
For the record, I thought it obvious that my argument above implied that I claim aboutness to be a natural category (although I’m not perfectly sure it’s a sound argument). I deleted my comment because I deemed it low-quality, before knowing you responded to it.
I claim aboutness to be a natural category (although I’m not perfectly sure it’s a sound argument)
It’s not.
First, the only way it can be one is if “natural category” has the reductionist meaning of “a category based on distinctions that humans are biased towards using as discriminators”, rather than “a category that ‘naturally’ exists in the territory”. (Categories are abstractions, not physical entities, after all.)
And second, even if you do use the reductionist meaning of “natural category”, then this does not in any way undermine the conclusion that “aboutness” is mind projection when you omit the entity mapping that aboutness from the description.
In other words, this argument appears to result in only one of two possibilities: either “aboutness” is not a natural category per the reductionist definition, and thus inherently a mind projection when the attribution source is omitted, or “aboutness” is a natural category per the reductionist definition… in which case the attribution source has to be a human brain (i.e., in another map).
Finally, if we entirely reject the reductionist definition of “natural category”, then “natural category” is itself an instance of the mind projection fallacy, since the description omits any definition of for whom the category is “natural”.
In short, QED: the argument is not sound. (I just didn’t want to bother typing all this if you were going to retreat to a claim this was never your argument.)
There are natural categories, like “tigers”, that don’t require much of a mind to define. It’s not mind projection fallacy to say that something is a tiger.
P.S. I’m correcting self-censoring threshold, so expect silence where before I’d say something for the fifth time.
Is that actually an argument? ’cause it sounds like a random sentence injected into the conversation, perhaps as an invitation for me to waste time tearing “natural categories” to shreds, while leaving you still able to deny that your statement actually relates in any substantial way to your point… thereby once again relieving you of any need to actually defend your position.
That is, are you actually claiming aboutness to be a natural category? Or just trying to get me to treat your argument as if you were doing so?
I already did and do expect it; see my “prediction” in the parent to your comment. I predicted that you would remain silent on any substantive issues, and avoid admitting anywhere where you were mistaken or incorrect. (I notice, for example, that you went back and deleted the comment where you said I was using “mind projection fallacy” incorrectly, rather than admit your attack was in error.)
And, as predicted, you avoided directly addressing the actual point of contention, instead choosing to enter a new piece of handwaving to imply that I am doing something else wrong.
That is, you appear to now be implying that I am using an overbroad definition of the MPF, without actually saying that I am doing it, or that your statement is in any way connected to your own position. This is a nice double bind, since either way I interpret the statement, you can retreat… and throw in more irrelevancies.
I don’t know if “troll” is a natural category, but you’re sure getting close to where I’d mind-project your behavior as matching that of one. ;-)
For the record, I thought it obvious that my argument above implied that I claim aboutness to be a natural category (although I’m not perfectly sure it’s a sound argument). I deleted my comment because I deemed it low-quality, before knowing you responded to it.
It’s not.
First, the only way it can be one is if “natural category” has the reductionist meaning of “a category based on distinctions that humans are biased towards using as discriminators”, rather than “a category that ‘naturally’ exists in the territory”. (Categories are abstractions, not physical entities, after all.)
And second, even if you do use the reductionist meaning of “natural category”, then this does not in any way undermine the conclusion that “aboutness” is mind projection when you omit the entity mapping that aboutness from the description.
In other words, this argument appears to result in only one of two possibilities: either “aboutness” is not a natural category per the reductionist definition, and thus inherently a mind projection when the attribution source is omitted, or “aboutness” is a natural category per the reductionist definition… in which case the attribution source has to be a human brain (i.e., in another map).
Finally, if we entirely reject the reductionist definition of “natural category”, then “natural category” is itself an instance of the mind projection fallacy, since the description omits any definition of for whom the category is “natural”.
In short, QED: the argument is not sound. (I just didn’t want to bother typing all this if you were going to retreat to a claim this was never your argument.)