The main claim of the article does not depend on the exact mechanism of time travel, which I have chosen not to discuss in detail. The claim is that we should devote some thought to possible existential risks related to time travel.
The argument about presentism is that the past does not ontologically exist, so “travel” into it is impossible. Even if one travels to what appears to be the past, it would not have any causal effects along the timeline.
I was referring to something like eternal return—where all of existence happens again and again, but without new memories being formed. The only effect of such a loop is anthropic—it has a higher measure than a non-looped timeline. This implies that we are more likely to exist in such a loop and in a universe where this is possible.
The main claim of the article does not depend on the exact mechanism of time travel, which I have chosen not to discuss in detail. The claim is that we should devote some thought to possible existential risks related to time travel.
The argument about presentism is that the past does not ontologically exist, so “travel” into it is impossible. Even if one travels to what appears to be the past, it would not have any causal effects along the timeline.
I was referring to something like eternal return—where all of existence happens again and again, but without new memories being formed. The only effect of such a loop is anthropic—it has a higher measure than a non-looped timeline. This implies that we are more likely to exist in such a loop and in a universe where this is possible.