“words should be used in such a way to maximize their usefulness in carving reality”
That does not mean that we should not use general words, but that we should have both general words and specific words. That is why it is right to speak of morality in general, and human morality in particular.
As I stated in other replies, it is not true that this disagreement is only about words. In general, when people disagree about how words should be used, that is because they disagree about what should be done. Because when you use words differently, you are likely to end up doing different things. And I gave concrete places where I disagree with Eliezer about what should be done, ways that correspond to how I disagree with him about morality.
In general I would describe the disagreement in the following way, although I agree that he would not accept this characterization: Eliezer believes that human values are intrinsically arbitrary. We just happen to value a certain set of things, and we might have happened to value some other random set. In whatever situation we found ourselves, we would have called those things “right,” and that would have been a name for the concrete values we had.
In contrast, I think that we value the things that are good for us. What is “good for us” is not arbitrary, but an objective fact about relationships between human nature and the world. Now there might well be other rational creatures and they might value other things. That will be because other things are good for them.
I agree that not everything in particular that people value is good for them. I say that everything that they value in a fundamental way is good for them. If you disagree, and think that some people value things that are bad for them in a fundamental way, how are they supposed to find out that those things are bad for them?
You are currently saying that the good is what people fundamentally value, and what people fundamentally value is good....for them. To escape vacuity, the second phrase would need to be cashed out as something like “side survival”.
But whose survival? If I fight for my tribe, I endanger my own survival, if I dodge the draft, I endanger my tribes’.
Real world ethics has a pretty clear answer: the group wins every time. Bravery beats cowardice, generosity beats meanness...these are human universals. if you reverse engineer that observation back into a theoretical understanding, you get the idea that morality is something programned into individuals by communities to promote the survival and thriving of communities.
But that is a rather different claim to The Good is the Good.
Clarification please. How do you avoid this supposed vacuity applying to basically all definitions? Taking a quick definition from a Google Search:
A: “I define a cat as a small domesticated carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractile claws.”
B: “Yes, but is that a cat?”
Which could eventually lead back to A saying that:
A: “Yes you’ve said all these things, but it basically comes back to the claim a cat is a cat.”
Definitions are at best a record of usage. Usage can be broadened to include social practices such as reward and punishment. And the jails are full of people who commit theft (selfishness) , rape (ditto), etc. And the medals and plaudits go to the brave (altruism), the generous (ditto), etc.
I’m not sure how you’re addressing what I said. What do you mean by escaping vacuity? I used “good for them” in that comment because you did, when you said that not everything people value is good for them. I agree with that, if you mean the particular values that people have, but not in regard to their fundamental values.
Saying that something is morally good means “doing this thing, after considering all the factors, is good for me,” and saying that it is morally bad means “doing this thing, after considering all the factors, is bad for me.” Of course something might be somewhat good, without being morally good, because it is good according to some factors, but not after considering all of them. And of course whether or not it will benefit your communities is one of the factors.
I’m going to assume you mean what you say and are not just arguing about definitions. In that case:
You would be an apologist for HP Lovecraft’s Azathoth, at best, if you lived in his universe. There’s no objective criterion you could give to explain why that wouldn’t be moral, unless you beg the question and bring in moral criteria to judge a possible ‘ground of morality.’ Yes, I’m saying Nyarlathotep should follow morality instead of the supposed dictates of his alien god. And that’s not a contradiction but a tautology.
While I’m on the subject, Aquinian theology is an ugly vulgarization of Aristotle’s, the latter being more naturally linked to HPL’s Azathoth or the divine pirates of Pastafarianism.
That is why it is right to speak of morality in general, and human morality in particular.
I prefer Eliezer’s way because it makes evident, when talking to someone who hasn’t read the Sequence, that there are different set of self-consistent values, but it’s an agreement that people should have before starting to debate and I personally would have no problem in talking about different moralities.
Eliezer believes that human values are intrinsically arbitrary
But does he? Because that would be demonstrably false. Maybe arbitrary in the sense of “occupying a tiny space in the whole set of all possible values”, but since our morality is shaped by evolution, it will contain surely some historical accident but also a lot of useful heuristics. No human can value drinking poison, for example.
What is “good for us” is not arbitrary, but an objective fact about relationships between human nature and the world
If you were to unpack “good”, would you insert other meanings besides “what helps our survival”?
“There are different sets of self-consistent values.” This is true, but I do not agree that all logically possible sets of self-consistent values represent moralities. For example, it would be logically possible for an animal to value nothing but killing itself; but this does not represent a morality, because such an animal cannot exist in reality in a stable manner. It cannot come into existence in a natural way (namely by evolution) at all, even if you might be able to produce one artificially. If you do produce one artificially, it will just kill itself and then it will not exist.
This is part of what I was saying about how when people use words differently they hope to accomplish different things. I speak of morality in general, not to mean “logically consistent set of values”, but a set that could reasonably exist in the real word with a real intelligent being. In other words, restricting morality to human values is an indirect way of promoting the position that human values are arbitrary.
As I said, I don’t think Eliezer would accept that characterization of his position, and you give one reason why he would not. But he has a more general view where only some sets of values are possible for merely accidental reasons, namely because it just happens that things cannot evolve in other ways. I would say the contrary—it is not an accident that the value of killing yourself cannot evolve, but this is because killing yourself is bad.
And this kind of explains how “good” has to be unpacked. Good would be what tends to cause tendencies towards itself. Survival is one example, but not the only one, even if everything else will at least have to be consistent with that value. So e.g. not only is survival valued by intelligent creatures in all realistic conditions, but so is knowledge. So knowledge and survival are both good for all intelligent creatures. But since different creatures will produce their knowledge and survival in different ways, different things will be good for them in relation to these ends.
“words should be used in such a way to maximize their usefulness in carving reality”
That does not mean that we should not use general words, but that we should have both general words and specific words. That is why it is right to speak of morality in general, and human morality in particular.
As I stated in other replies, it is not true that this disagreement is only about words. In general, when people disagree about how words should be used, that is because they disagree about what should be done. Because when you use words differently, you are likely to end up doing different things. And I gave concrete places where I disagree with Eliezer about what should be done, ways that correspond to how I disagree with him about morality.
In general I would describe the disagreement in the following way, although I agree that he would not accept this characterization: Eliezer believes that human values are intrinsically arbitrary. We just happen to value a certain set of things, and we might have happened to value some other random set. In whatever situation we found ourselves, we would have called those things “right,” and that would have been a name for the concrete values we had.
In contrast, I think that we value the things that are good for us. What is “good for us” is not arbitrary, but an objective fact about relationships between human nature and the world. Now there might well be other rational creatures and they might value other things. That will be because other things are good for them.
But not everything people value is actually good for them. You are retaining the problem of equating morality with values.
I agree that not everything in particular that people value is good for them. I say that everything that they value in a fundamental way is good for them. If you disagree, and think that some people value things that are bad for them in a fundamental way, how are they supposed to find out that those things are bad for them?
You are currently saying that the good is what people fundamentally value, and what people fundamentally value is good....for them. To escape vacuity, the second phrase would need to be cashed out as something like “side survival”.
But whose survival? If I fight for my tribe, I endanger my own survival, if I dodge the draft, I endanger my tribes’.
Real world ethics has a pretty clear answer: the group wins every time. Bravery beats cowardice, generosity beats meanness...these are human universals. if you reverse engineer that observation back into a theoretical understanding, you get the idea that morality is something programned into individuals by communities to promote the survival and thriving of communities.
But that is a rather different claim to The Good is the Good.
Clarification please. How do you avoid this supposed vacuity applying to basically all definitions? Taking a quick definition from a Google Search: A: “I define a cat as a small domesticated carnivorous mammal with soft fur, a short snout, and retractile claws.” B: “Yes, but is that a cat?”
Which could eventually lead back to A saying that:
A: “Yes you’ve said all these things, but it basically comes back to the claim a cat is a cat.”
Definitions are at best a record of usage. Usage can be broadened to include social practices such as reward and punishment. And the jails are full of people who commit theft (selfishness) , rape (ditto), etc. And the medals and plaudits go to the brave (altruism), the generous (ditto), etc.
I’m not sure how you’re addressing what I said. What do you mean by escaping vacuity? I used “good for them” in that comment because you did, when you said that not everything people value is good for them. I agree with that, if you mean the particular values that people have, but not in regard to their fundamental values.
Saying that something is morally good means “doing this thing, after considering all the factors, is good for me,” and saying that it is morally bad means “doing this thing, after considering all the factors, is bad for me.” Of course something might be somewhat good, without being morally good, because it is good according to some factors, but not after considering all of them. And of course whether or not it will benefit your communities is one of the factors.
I’m going to assume you mean what you say and are not just arguing about definitions. In that case:
You would be an apologist for HP Lovecraft’s Azathoth, at best, if you lived in his universe. There’s no objective criterion you could give to explain why that wouldn’t be moral, unless you beg the question and bring in moral criteria to judge a possible ‘ground of morality.’ Yes, I’m saying Nyarlathotep should follow morality instead of the supposed dictates of his alien god. And that’s not a contradiction but a tautology.
While I’m on the subject, Aquinian theology is an ugly vulgarization of Aristotle’s, the latter being more naturally linked to HPL’s Azathoth or the divine pirates of Pastafarianism.
I’m pretty sure this is not an attempt at discussion, but an attempt to be insulting, so I won’t discuss it.
I prefer Eliezer’s way because it makes evident, when talking to someone who hasn’t read the Sequence, that there are different set of self-consistent values, but it’s an agreement that people should have before starting to debate and I personally would have no problem in talking about different moralities.
But does he? Because that would be demonstrably false. Maybe arbitrary in the sense of “occupying a tiny space in the whole set of all possible values”, but since our morality is shaped by evolution, it will contain surely some historical accident but also a lot of useful heuristics.
No human can value drinking poison, for example.
If you were to unpack “good”, would you insert other meanings besides “what helps our survival”?
“There are different sets of self-consistent values.” This is true, but I do not agree that all logically possible sets of self-consistent values represent moralities. For example, it would be logically possible for an animal to value nothing but killing itself; but this does not represent a morality, because such an animal cannot exist in reality in a stable manner. It cannot come into existence in a natural way (namely by evolution) at all, even if you might be able to produce one artificially. If you do produce one artificially, it will just kill itself and then it will not exist.
This is part of what I was saying about how when people use words differently they hope to accomplish different things. I speak of morality in general, not to mean “logically consistent set of values”, but a set that could reasonably exist in the real word with a real intelligent being. In other words, restricting morality to human values is an indirect way of promoting the position that human values are arbitrary.
As I said, I don’t think Eliezer would accept that characterization of his position, and you give one reason why he would not. But he has a more general view where only some sets of values are possible for merely accidental reasons, namely because it just happens that things cannot evolve in other ways. I would say the contrary—it is not an accident that the value of killing yourself cannot evolve, but this is because killing yourself is bad.
And this kind of explains how “good” has to be unpacked. Good would be what tends to cause tendencies towards itself. Survival is one example, but not the only one, even if everything else will at least have to be consistent with that value. So e.g. not only is survival valued by intelligent creatures in all realistic conditions, but so is knowledge. So knowledge and survival are both good for all intelligent creatures. But since different creatures will produce their knowledge and survival in different ways, different things will be good for them in relation to these ends.
Any virulently self-reproducing meme would be another.
This would be a long discussion, but there’s some truth in that, and some falsehood.