This random drift seems obviously caused by humans’ lack of sufficient intelligence/agency/cooperation, not some sort of fundamental problem with slack?
Do you have a preferred formalism for this? UDT doesn’t have a standard temporal coherence theorem by default, since even allowing some deviation from EUM (geometric means, logical induction, etc.), the UDT “prior” can be reinterpreted as a probutility measure, with only minor distortion (magnitude of distortion conjectured acceptable for humans) caused by the structure of the UDT chains provided by your multiverse theory. Since UDT does no updating, there are no further conflicts between probability and utility[1].
@Vladimir_Nesov suggests being careful here[2] and his proposal[3]intentionally allows some value drift. I think this is more drift than you want, but unless I impose severe fairness restrictions on the set of situations I consider, I haven’t been able to avoid increasing constraints on the fixed point to the point that a human would have trouble distinguishing Nesov’s solution from certain ways of implementing a locked in utility function. Descriptively, this is quite close to the problem that almost all attempts at implementing “balance” fall to enough optimization pressure, unless the preferred outcome is proven to result[4]. Either the updateless core lets the aggregate substantially fall to manipulators, or it acts substantially like it has a fixed utility function (assuming modified Critch boundaries are enforced by Nesov’s sysops, and the majority of situations are close to locally SIA=SSA fair[5] (the latter presumably following the updateless cores of most humans)).
Do you have a preferred formalism for this? UDT doesn’t have a standard temporal coherence theorem by default, since even allowing some deviation from EUM (geometric means, logical induction, etc.), the UDT “prior” can be reinterpreted as a probutility measure, with only minor distortion (magnitude of distortion conjectured acceptable for humans) caused by the structure of the UDT chains provided by your multiverse theory. Since UDT does no updating, there are no further conflicts between probability and utility[1].
@Vladimir_Nesov suggests being careful here[2] and his proposal[3] intentionally allows some value drift. I think this is more drift than you want, but unless I impose severe fairness restrictions on the set of situations I consider, I haven’t been able to avoid increasing constraints on the fixed point to the point that a human would have trouble distinguishing Nesov’s solution from certain ways of implementing a locked in utility function. Descriptively, this is quite close to the problem that almost all attempts at implementing “balance” fall to enough optimization pressure, unless the preferred outcome is proven to result[4]. Either the updateless core lets the aggregate substantially fall to manipulators, or it acts substantially like it has a fixed utility function (assuming modified Critch boundaries are enforced by Nesov’s sysops, and the majority of situations are close to locally SIA=SSA fair[5] (the latter presumably following the updateless cores of most humans)).
Indeed, because of this, a probutility semimeasure may be acceptable. Solomonoff, potentially unpublished letter.
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/ZLary4FDY7kQaGfc3/existential-risk-from-ai-an-exposition-for-mathematicians?commentId=tBYP7bAhfNnokqFyZ
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/vzHtHHBJoKATi5SeK/empowerment-corrigibility-etc-are-simple-abstractions-of-a?commentId=BjQrqeKfov946oAKj
Presumably, to prove this you would first need to formalize metaphilosophy.
Though outdated, see Anthropic Decision Theory