Fore pure physicalist (I am not but some people on LW expressed this view) there is no meaningful first-person perspective: only third view is objective. So there is no “I” which somehow appears in one of two copies. From third objective view, both copies have the same information, and that’s all.
We don’t need to deny that there’s a meaningful first-person perspective, only that any particular first-person perspective is special (in this case, special in that it’s the ‘true’ continuation of the original). When a perfect copy is made, two meaningful first-person perspectives exist, they both see themselves as continuations of the original, and neither is more right or wrong than the other in any deep sense.
Fore pure physicalist (I am not but some people on LW expressed this view) there is no meaningful first-person perspective: only third view is objective. So there is no “I” which somehow appears in one of two copies. From third objective view, both copies have the same information, and that’s all.
We don’t need to deny that there’s a meaningful first-person perspective, only that any particular first-person perspective is special (in this case, special in that it’s the ‘true’ continuation of the original). When a perfect copy is made, two meaningful first-person perspectives exist, they both see themselves as continuations of the original, and neither is more right or wrong than the other in any deep sense.