You’re speculating on a topic on which we have no way to collect evidence. We can’t measure qualia or experience—we have only self-reported information about identity, and none of it includes copying.
Now we have two Rogers—R1 and R2. And it seems obvious that they do not share one and the same consciousness: they are two different consciousnesses of identical personalities.
(If this isn’t obvious to you, I’d genuinely like to hear how two brains, isolated from each other, could share a single consciousness. Obviously, I’m a physicalist.)
It’s unclear whether you think there is an instantaneous experience, or if all experience is over time (reminder: we have no measurements that would provide evidence here). It seems obvious to me that R1 and R2 at that point in time share all memories and experiences-in-progress up to and including the point of copy. And for some number of milliseconds afterward, there won’t be time for new inputs or environmental changes to have any impact, so they remain identical.
Of course, they begin to diverge as the different environments come into play. However, they diverge about as much from each other as each does from their shared past. You’re not the same person you were 10 minutes ago, and they’re not the same person as each other.
Of course, I agree that our personality is constantly changing. In my post, I wanted to reflect on the fact that even with perfect cloning, R1 would retain its sense of self, while R2 would develop its own separate sense of self. Both would have two separate “first-person perspectives,” even if we imagine that time has frozen and they remain two completely perfect copies. I mean, they would not become a single consciousness connected by invisible threads.
I don’t agree (or I misunderstand something about the scenario).
With a perfect copy of all identity-relevant state, BOTH R1 and R2 retain their sense of self—they’re identical at the point of copy. They EACH continue to develop their selves independently. They diverge from each other and from their shared past, but there’s no distinction or privilege of the “original”.
Unless the copy process is flawed, but that’s not part of this thought experiment. To a great extent, this is a definition question: if there is an internally-detectable difference (a way to tell which is the original), that means the copy was imperfect.
You’re speculating on a topic on which we have no way to collect evidence. We can’t measure qualia or experience—we have only self-reported information about identity, and none of it includes copying.
It’s unclear whether you think there is an instantaneous experience, or if all experience is over time (reminder: we have no measurements that would provide evidence here). It seems obvious to me that R1 and R2 at that point in time share all memories and experiences-in-progress up to and including the point of copy. And for some number of milliseconds afterward, there won’t be time for new inputs or environmental changes to have any impact, so they remain identical.
Of course, they begin to diverge as the different environments come into play. However, they diverge about as much from each other as each does from their shared past. You’re not the same person you were 10 minutes ago, and they’re not the same person as each other.
Of course, I agree that our personality is constantly changing. In my post, I wanted to reflect on the fact that even with perfect cloning, R1 would retain its sense of self, while R2 would develop its own separate sense of self. Both would have two separate “first-person perspectives,” even if we imagine that time has frozen and they remain two completely perfect copies. I mean, they would not become a single consciousness connected by invisible threads.
I don’t agree (or I misunderstand something about the scenario).
With a perfect copy of all identity-relevant state, BOTH R1 and R2 retain their sense of self—they’re identical at the point of copy. They EACH continue to develop their selves independently. They diverge from each other and from their shared past, but there’s no distinction or privilege of the “original”.
Unless the copy process is flawed, but that’s not part of this thought experiment. To a great extent, this is a definition question: if there is an internally-detectable difference (a way to tell which is the original), that means the copy was imperfect.