I don’t agree (or I misunderstand something about the scenario).
With a perfect copy of all identity-relevant state, BOTH R1 and R2 retain their sense of self—they’re identical at the point of copy. They EACH continue to develop their selves independently. They diverge from each other and from their shared past, but there’s no distinction or privilege of the “original”.
Unless the copy process is flawed, but that’s not part of this thought experiment. To a great extent, this is a definition question: if there is an internally-detectable difference (a way to tell which is the original), that means the copy was imperfect.
I don’t agree (or I misunderstand something about the scenario).
With a perfect copy of all identity-relevant state, BOTH R1 and R2 retain their sense of self—they’re identical at the point of copy. They EACH continue to develop their selves independently. They diverge from each other and from their shared past, but there’s no distinction or privilege of the “original”.
Unless the copy process is flawed, but that’s not part of this thought experiment. To a great extent, this is a definition question: if there is an internally-detectable difference (a way to tell which is the original), that means the copy was imperfect.