I worry a lot about trying to reason about very complex equilibria when only looking at one force. It’s _BOTH_ an adversarial and cooperative game—there are (asymmetric, but usually same sign) benefits to clear, honest communication. And even for adversarial portions, there may be a positive sum even when one player is harmed, if other players gain more than the harm.
I can make a model, even, that outsourcing the punishment so that extra-judgey people get most of the flak for the judgement, but still provide overall value, is optimal for some utility aggregation functions. I don’t currently like or claim applicability of this model, but it’s not obviously wrong.
I worry a lot about trying to reason about very complex equilibria when only looking at one force. It’s _BOTH_ an adversarial and cooperative game—there are (asymmetric, but usually same sign) benefits to clear, honest communication. And even for adversarial portions, there may be a positive sum even when one player is harmed, if other players gain more than the harm.
I can make a model, even, that outsourcing the punishment so that extra-judgey people get most of the flak for the judgement, but still provide overall value, is optimal for some utility aggregation functions. I don’t currently like or claim applicability of this model, but it’s not obviously wrong.