Agreed that it’s a stretch; “hidden ethics” and “stated ethics” is a much more natural divide for the two. I do think that “convenience” and “lookin’ good” depends on the agent-world pair, but I think the adaption is opaque and slow (i.e. learn it when you’re young over a long period) rather than explicit and fast.
I don’t see how this is so.
I was unclear there as well; I’m assuming that the “right” result is the one that maximizes the health and social standing of the implementer. Targeting that directly is easy; targeting it indirectly by using animal welfare is hard.
Oh, and I don’t believe modern America has a “well-developed understanding of nutrition”, though it’s a separate discussion altogether.
I was unclear; I meant that vegetarianism is safer for individuals with a well-developed understanding, not that urban America as a whole has a well-developed understanding.
I don’t understand. What does specialization of labor has to do with morality?
Many moral questions are hard to figure out, especially when they rely on second or third order effects. Think of the parable of the broken window, of journalistic, clerical, or medical ethics which promise non-intervention or secrecy. There is strong value in the communication of moral claims, which I’m not sure how to distinguish from social pressure (and think social pressure may be a necessary part of communicating those claims).
There is strong value in the communication of moral claims
It seems to me the issues of trust and credibility are dominant here. People get moral claims thrown at them constantly from different directions, many of them are incompatible or sometimes even direct opposites of each other. One needs some system of sorting them out, of evaluating them and deciding whether to accept them or not. Popularity is, of course, one such system but it has its problems, especially when moral claims come from those with power. There are obvious incentives in spreading moral memes advantageous to you.
I guess I see the social communication of moral claims to be strongly manipulated by those who stand to gain from it (which basically means those with power—political, commercial, religious, etc.) and so suspect.
Agreed that it’s a stretch; “hidden ethics” and “stated ethics” is a much more natural divide for the two. I do think that “convenience” and “lookin’ good” depends on the agent-world pair, but I think the adaption is opaque and slow (i.e. learn it when you’re young over a long period) rather than explicit and fast.
I was unclear there as well; I’m assuming that the “right” result is the one that maximizes the health and social standing of the implementer. Targeting that directly is easy; targeting it indirectly by using animal welfare is hard.
I was unclear; I meant that vegetarianism is safer for individuals with a well-developed understanding, not that urban America as a whole has a well-developed understanding.
Many moral questions are hard to figure out, especially when they rely on second or third order effects. Think of the parable of the broken window, of journalistic, clerical, or medical ethics which promise non-intervention or secrecy. There is strong value in the communication of moral claims, which I’m not sure how to distinguish from social pressure (and think social pressure may be a necessary part of communicating those claims).
It seems to me the issues of trust and credibility are dominant here. People get moral claims thrown at them constantly from different directions, many of them are incompatible or sometimes even direct opposites of each other. One needs some system of sorting them out, of evaluating them and deciding whether to accept them or not. Popularity is, of course, one such system but it has its problems, especially when moral claims come from those with power. There are obvious incentives in spreading moral memes advantageous to you.
I guess I see the social communication of moral claims to be strongly manipulated by those who stand to gain from it (which basically means those with power—political, commercial, religious, etc.) and so suspect.