I would cluster ethics as rules that eat scenarios and output actions, and meta-ethics as rules that eat agent-world pairs and output ethics.
Ah. That makes a lot of sense.
for most people, stated justifications follow decisions rather than decisions following stated justifications.
True, but the key word here is “stated”.
making decisions in near mode and justifying those decisions in far mode, which in the language I’m using here would look like far mode as ethics and near mode as meta-ethics.
That doesn’t look right to me. For most people (those who justify post-factum) the majority of their ethics is submerged, below their consciousness level. That’s why “stated” is a very important qualifier. People necessarily make decisions based on their “real” ethics but bringing the real reasons to the surface might not be psychologically acceptable to them, so post-factum justifications come into play.
I don’t think people making decisions in near mode apply rules that “eat agent-world pairs and output ethics”. I think that for many people factors like “convenience”, “lookin’ good”, and “let’s discount far future to zero” play considerably larger role in their real ethics than they are willing to admit or even realize.
A metaethical system which recommends vegetarianism in America where it’s cheap and recommends against it in undeveloped areas where it’s expensive seems easy to construct; an ethical system which measures the weal gained and the woe inflicted to animals by eating meat and gets the balancing parameter just right to make the same recommendations seems difficult to construct.
I don’t see how this is so. Your meta-ethical system will still need to get that balancing parameter “just right” unless you start with the end result being known. Just because you divide the path from moral axioms to actions into several stages you don’t get to avoid sections of that path, you still need to walk it all.
Oh, and I don’t believe modern America has a “well-developed understanding of nutrition”, though it’s a separate discussion altogether.
Even if you give individuals primacy, specialization of labor is still a powerful force for efficiency.
I don’t understand. What does specialization of labor has to do with morality?
And perhaps I should clarify my reaction. When I saw “All the cool kids are vegetarian these days” called “an actual and strong reason” to adopt this morality—well, my first thought was “All the cool kids root out hidden Jews / string up uppity Negroes / find and kill Tutsi / denounce the educated agents of imperialism / etc.” That must be an actual and strong reason to adopt this set of morals as well, right?
I don’t know how to figure out whether social influence is a net positive given that in practice social influence is always there and you can’t find a control group. My point is that accepting morality because many other people seem to follow it is a very dubious heuristic for me.
Agreed that it’s a stretch; “hidden ethics” and “stated ethics” is a much more natural divide for the two. I do think that “convenience” and “lookin’ good” depends on the agent-world pair, but I think the adaption is opaque and slow (i.e. learn it when you’re young over a long period) rather than explicit and fast.
I don’t see how this is so.
I was unclear there as well; I’m assuming that the “right” result is the one that maximizes the health and social standing of the implementer. Targeting that directly is easy; targeting it indirectly by using animal welfare is hard.
Oh, and I don’t believe modern America has a “well-developed understanding of nutrition”, though it’s a separate discussion altogether.
I was unclear; I meant that vegetarianism is safer for individuals with a well-developed understanding, not that urban America as a whole has a well-developed understanding.
I don’t understand. What does specialization of labor has to do with morality?
Many moral questions are hard to figure out, especially when they rely on second or third order effects. Think of the parable of the broken window, of journalistic, clerical, or medical ethics which promise non-intervention or secrecy. There is strong value in the communication of moral claims, which I’m not sure how to distinguish from social pressure (and think social pressure may be a necessary part of communicating those claims).
There is strong value in the communication of moral claims
It seems to me the issues of trust and credibility are dominant here. People get moral claims thrown at them constantly from different directions, many of them are incompatible or sometimes even direct opposites of each other. One needs some system of sorting them out, of evaluating them and deciding whether to accept them or not. Popularity is, of course, one such system but it has its problems, especially when moral claims come from those with power. There are obvious incentives in spreading moral memes advantageous to you.
I guess I see the social communication of moral claims to be strongly manipulated by those who stand to gain from it (which basically means those with power—political, commercial, religious, etc.) and so suspect.
Ah. That makes a lot of sense.
True, but the key word here is “stated”.
That doesn’t look right to me. For most people (those who justify post-factum) the majority of their ethics is submerged, below their consciousness level. That’s why “stated” is a very important qualifier. People necessarily make decisions based on their “real” ethics but bringing the real reasons to the surface might not be psychologically acceptable to them, so post-factum justifications come into play.
I don’t think people making decisions in near mode apply rules that “eat agent-world pairs and output ethics”. I think that for many people factors like “convenience”, “lookin’ good”, and “let’s discount far future to zero” play considerably larger role in their real ethics than they are willing to admit or even realize.
I don’t see how this is so. Your meta-ethical system will still need to get that balancing parameter “just right” unless you start with the end result being known. Just because you divide the path from moral axioms to actions into several stages you don’t get to avoid sections of that path, you still need to walk it all.
Oh, and I don’t believe modern America has a “well-developed understanding of nutrition”, though it’s a separate discussion altogether.
I don’t understand. What does specialization of labor has to do with morality?
And perhaps I should clarify my reaction. When I saw “All the cool kids are vegetarian these days” called “an actual and strong reason” to adopt this morality—well, my first thought was “All the cool kids root out hidden Jews / string up uppity Negroes / find and kill Tutsi / denounce the educated agents of imperialism / etc.” That must be an actual and strong reason to adopt this set of morals as well, right?
I don’t know how to figure out whether social influence is a net positive given that in practice social influence is always there and you can’t find a control group. My point is that accepting morality because many other people seem to follow it is a very dubious heuristic for me.
Agreed that it’s a stretch; “hidden ethics” and “stated ethics” is a much more natural divide for the two. I do think that “convenience” and “lookin’ good” depends on the agent-world pair, but I think the adaption is opaque and slow (i.e. learn it when you’re young over a long period) rather than explicit and fast.
I was unclear there as well; I’m assuming that the “right” result is the one that maximizes the health and social standing of the implementer. Targeting that directly is easy; targeting it indirectly by using animal welfare is hard.
I was unclear; I meant that vegetarianism is safer for individuals with a well-developed understanding, not that urban America as a whole has a well-developed understanding.
Many moral questions are hard to figure out, especially when they rely on second or third order effects. Think of the parable of the broken window, of journalistic, clerical, or medical ethics which promise non-intervention or secrecy. There is strong value in the communication of moral claims, which I’m not sure how to distinguish from social pressure (and think social pressure may be a necessary part of communicating those claims).
It seems to me the issues of trust and credibility are dominant here. People get moral claims thrown at them constantly from different directions, many of them are incompatible or sometimes even direct opposites of each other. One needs some system of sorting them out, of evaluating them and deciding whether to accept them or not. Popularity is, of course, one such system but it has its problems, especially when moral claims come from those with power. There are obvious incentives in spreading moral memes advantageous to you.
I guess I see the social communication of moral claims to be strongly manipulated by those who stand to gain from it (which basically means those with power—political, commercial, religious, etc.) and so suspect.