It reminds me about later post about Why Biological Anchors Never Work where was the moment with “imagine how funny it could be for aliens to choose this exact moment when you say your phone won’t hover, to make it hover” and that in fact it won’t hover. In a sense, it is dictated by priors. There is some giant number of universes where just one miracle happens. But all of them diverge, all of them are different. And amount of universes where miracles are regular is less than that, but they converge. So all the universes where just one miracle happens generally look like perfectly regular universes.
That reminds me of question “if we live in Tegmark 4, why there aren’t irregularities like clothes turning into a crocodile”. The answer to me seems that there is no reason to prioritize human concepts like cloth or crocodile. Most of bitstrings of irregularities will look completely random to humans, like quantum noise. Which, we actually observe. So it seems to me like an evidence that we actually do live in Tegmark 4. If we lived in classic deterministic universe where there is no quantum randomness, it would be evidence against us being in Tegmark 4. But it ends up that all possible programs with irregularities which diverge from regular laws of physics sum up to being random in each particular universe. (Which also seems to me as evidence that quantum mechanics isn’t some high level physics law, but rather bottom level result of how programs are structured in Tegmark 4.)
What I infer from that is that if we were to expect some miracles we would have already seen them, and since we haven’t seen them, then we should expect miracles which are on average not different from randomness.
Or to pose in the god framework, then as I now understand, the main problem of God hypotheses is “which one”, all the excuses like “divine ways are mysterious” don’t allow you to determine whether it is Yhwh, Allah or Zeus, and unless all of them exist simultaneously, you need to distribute probability among all of them, and so each one of them becomes unlikely already on priors, even if you take only socially established Gods, not just all descriptions of Gods. It doesn’t make sense to argue with concrete religion, because first you need to choose why even that religion.
And the same prior argument works for optimization targets. You can’t avoid improbability by saying it was being optimized, because you now just need to prove the improbability of some optimization target among all optimization targets.
It reminds me about later post about Why Biological Anchors Never Work where was the moment with “imagine how funny it could be for aliens to choose this exact moment when you say your phone won’t hover, to make it hover” and that in fact it won’t hover. In a sense, it is dictated by priors. There is some giant number of universes where just one miracle happens. But all of them diverge, all of them are different. And amount of universes where miracles are regular is less than that, but they converge. So all the universes where just one miracle happens generally look like perfectly regular universes.
That reminds me of question “if we live in Tegmark 4, why there aren’t irregularities like clothes turning into a crocodile”. The answer to me seems that there is no reason to prioritize human concepts like cloth or crocodile. Most of bitstrings of irregularities will look completely random to humans, like quantum noise. Which, we actually observe. So it seems to me like an evidence that we actually do live in Tegmark 4. If we lived in classic deterministic universe where there is no quantum randomness, it would be evidence against us being in Tegmark 4. But it ends up that all possible programs with irregularities which diverge from regular laws of physics sum up to being random in each particular universe. (Which also seems to me as evidence that quantum mechanics isn’t some high level physics law, but rather bottom level result of how programs are structured in Tegmark 4.)
What I infer from that is that if we were to expect some miracles we would have already seen them, and since we haven’t seen them, then we should expect miracles which are on average not different from randomness.
Or to pose in the god framework, then as I now understand, the main problem of God hypotheses is “which one”, all the excuses like “divine ways are mysterious” don’t allow you to determine whether it is Yhwh, Allah or Zeus, and unless all of them exist simultaneously, you need to distribute probability among all of them, and so each one of them becomes unlikely already on priors, even if you take only socially established Gods, not just all descriptions of Gods. It doesn’t make sense to argue with concrete religion, because first you need to choose why even that religion.
And the same prior argument works for optimization targets. You can’t avoid improbability by saying it was being optimized, because you now just need to prove the improbability of some optimization target among all optimization targets.