In my opinion, Llama2 and Mixtral are potentially already quite dangerous given the right fine-tuning regime.
Indeed, I think it seems pretty unlikely that these models (finetuned effectively using current methods) change the difficulty of making a bioweapon by more than a factor of 4x. (Though perhaps you think something like “these models (finetuned effectively) make it maybe 25% easier to make a bioweapon and that’s pretty scary”.)
Yes, I’m unsure about the multiplication factors on “likelihood of bad actor even trying to make a bioweapon” and on “likelihood of succeeding given the attempt”. I think probably both are closer to 4x than 1.25x. But I think it’s understandable that this claim on my part seems implausible. Hopefully at some point I’ll have a more objective measure available.
Indeed, I think it seems pretty unlikely that these models (finetuned effectively using current methods) change the difficulty of making a bioweapon by more than a factor of 4x. (Though perhaps you think something like “these models (finetuned effectively) make it maybe 25% easier to make a bioweapon and that’s pretty scary”.)
Yes, I’m unsure about the multiplication factors on “likelihood of bad actor even trying to make a bioweapon” and on “likelihood of succeeding given the attempt”. I think probably both are closer to 4x than 1.25x. But I think it’s understandable that this claim on my part seems implausible. Hopefully at some point I’ll have a more objective measure available.