The trillionaire example is both, while the millionaire example is is only a hyperstition, but they seem equally at odds with epistemic rationality.
Hyperstitions are just special cases of epistemically irrational but instrumentally useful beliefs (like believing in God in Pascal’s Wager, which is not a hyperstition), which would make them instrumentally rational—if beliefs were actions which we could pick according to their expected utility. But beliefs aren’t actions, we can’t decide what we believe, doxastic voluntarism is false.
The trillionaire example is both, while the millionaire example is is only a hyperstition, but they seem equally at odds with epistemic rationality.
Hyperstitions are just special cases of epistemically irrational but instrumentally useful beliefs (like believing in God in Pascal’s Wager, which is not a hyperstition), which would make them instrumentally rational—if beliefs were actions which we could pick according to their expected utility. But beliefs aren’t actions, we can’t decide what we believe, doxastic voluntarism is false.