What I mean by bad here is given a choice between World A where I’m eating something tasty and World B where I’m eating something yucky, World B is less preferable, so it is bad in that sense.
If it is to be a theory of ethics at all, it needs to be bad in an ethical sense—not in the sense of aesthetics or personal preference, or inefficency, or the various other things that “bad” can mean.
I didn’t say anything about punishment.
I brought it in to act as a criterion of ethical badness.
“Bad” is a highly ambiguous term. The badness of a bad apple is not that of a bad movie is not that of a bad person.
Goodness and badness are traits of experience and actions, not objects.
English allows us to describe a rotten apple as bad. There are non ethical senses of bad. That’s why it’s not clear that the hedonic kind of badness that is immediately apprehensible in experience , the kind that analytical hedonism is based on, is the ethical kind I’m not saying that ethical goodness and badness are properties of objects, I’m doubting that they are properties of experiences. There are a lot more than two theories. Maybe ethical properties aren’t anywhere.
Since there is doubt, it not clear that analytical hedonism is the one true theory of metaethics. Which is normal—it’s not clear that any other theory is—metaethics is not a solved probelm.
There’s an argument for Analytical Hedonic consequentialism, which states that you can just immediately tell me what’s good and bad..The bad stuff hurts, the good stuff feels pleasurable. It seems appealing to its adherent s because it doesn’t need to appeal to non physical properties existing outside the mind or divine commands.
It has two main problems: It’s not at all clear that the kind of goodness and badness that is immediately apprehendable is an ethical kind; and it’s not clear how my subjective perceptions mean I should behave in any particular way toward others , as I don’t feel their pains.
If it is to be a theory of ethics at all, it needs to be bad in an ethical sense—not in the sense of aesthetics or personal preference, or inefficency, or the various other things that “bad” can mean.
I brought it in to act as a criterion of ethical badness. “Bad” is a highly ambiguous term. The badness of a bad apple is not that of a bad movie is not that of a bad person.
English allows us to describe a rotten apple as bad. There are non ethical senses of bad. That’s why it’s not clear that the hedonic kind of badness that is immediately apprehensible in experience , the kind that analytical hedonism is based on, is the ethical kind I’m not saying that ethical goodness and badness are properties of objects, I’m doubting that they are properties of experiences. There are a lot more than two theories. Maybe ethical properties aren’t anywhere.
Since there is doubt, it not clear that analytical hedonism is the one true theory of metaethics. Which is normal—it’s not clear that any other theory is—metaethics is not a solved probelm.
There’s an argument for Analytical Hedonic consequentialism, which states that you can just immediately tell me what’s good and bad..The bad stuff hurts, the good stuff feels pleasurable. It seems appealing to its adherent s because it doesn’t need to appeal to non physical properties existing outside the mind or divine commands.
It has two main problems: It’s not at all clear that the kind of goodness and badness that is immediately apprehendable is an ethical kind; and it’s not clear how my subjective perceptions mean I should behave in any particular way toward others , as I don’t feel their pains.