@ Eliezer: “My metaethics is real and objective, just not universal. Fixed computations are objective, and at least halfway real.”
see wikipedia: - According to the ethical objectivist, the truth or falsity of typical moral judgments does not depend upon the beliefs or feelings of any person or group of persons. This view holds that moral propositions are analogous to propositions about chemistry, biology, or history: they describe (or fail to describe) a mind-independent reality. When they describe it accurately, they are true—no matter what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels.
@ Eliezer: “My metaethics is real and objective, just not universal. Fixed computations are objective, and at least halfway real.”
see wikipedia: - According to the ethical objectivist, the truth or falsity of typical moral judgments does not depend upon the beliefs or feelings of any person or group of persons. This view holds that moral propositions are analogous to propositions about chemistry, biology, or history: they describe (or fail to describe) a mind-independent reality. When they describe it accurately, they are true—no matter what anyone believes, hopes, wishes, or feels.