I’m defining free will as, eh, you know, that kind of thing that people are gesturing at when they talk about free will. (Or, equivalently, no, I’m not defining it.) Or, extensional definition: it’s the capacity-for-choice-flavored thing that humans have, dogs and AIs kind of have, flies maybe have tiny glimmers of, and plants and rocks don’t.
Are there any possible facts that could render free will illusory, eg. determinism?
I assert that determinism renders free will exactly as illusory as it renders temperature!
Is there any possible configuration of physics where free will us more than a stance or metaphor?
I… don’t know how I would tell whether a given universe had that property. Same if you replace “free will” with “temperature”.
I’m defining free will as, eh, you know, that kind of thing that people are gesturing at when they talk about free will
People mean different things by “free will”, which is why the question is worthy asking.
Different definitions of free will require freedom from different things. Much of the debate centres on Libertarian free will, which requires freedom from complete causal determinism (and therefore, freedom from inevitability). Libertarian free will requires leeway, or multiple possibilities at a moment in time. That’s often expressed as being able to act differently if the history if the universe were rewound. Compatibilist definitions of free will only require freedom from compulsion, and allow free will to exist in a deterministic universe . A third set of concerns is free will is a form of conscious control,top down control or initiation of action by an inner self.
Libertarian and compatibilist free will aren’t opposites. Compatibilism says you act freely and responsibly when you have a normally functioning brain , and lack external conclusion from another agent. Libertarians don’t have to reject the compatibilist criteria—it would be rather absurd that you can be free while being compelled—they just have to regard them as insufficient, because the further criterion of leeway is lacking.
Libertarian free will has sub-varieties.
One is “contra causal” free will, which requires freedom from physics, on the assumption that physics is deterministic. This is often connected with the idea of a supernatural soul, that is able to override the physics of the brain. In contrast, naturalistic libertarians seek to find free will within physics, by rejecting physical determinism; they regard indeterminism as a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition of free will.
Another is that free will requires freedom from any limitation whatsoever …but that is the definition of omnipotence. It is a straw-man position which is not adopted by actual believers in free will: believers in naturalistic free will accept that they are constrained by the laws of nature. Believers in supernatural free will believe that God alone is ominipotent
The question of whether physics allows free will does not depend on physics or neurology alone: it also depends on how free will is conceptualised. It is neither a purely scientific nor a purely philosophical issue.
Or, extensional definition: it’s the capacity-for-choice-flavored thing that humans have, dogs and AIs kind of have, flies maybe have tiny glimmers of, and plants and rocks don’t.
But whether humans have it is contentious. ..at least under the Libertarian definition.
It you think humans definitely have it , you’re siding with the compatiblist definition. Which in turn means the definition, not a discovery about the world, is doing most of the work.
? If so: I bet there is a deterministic physics very much like “ours minus quantum” ~= “the way people thought the world worked in 1890″, which could support human civilization as it existed when people were talking about free will a thousand years ago
Half of the talk about free will is people saying it doesn’t exist.
How are you defining free will?
Are there any possible facts that could render free will illusory, eg. determinism?
Is there any possible configuration of physics where free will us more than a stance or metaphor?
I’m defining free will as, eh, you know, that kind of thing that people are gesturing at when they talk about free will. (Or, equivalently, no, I’m not defining it.) Or, extensional definition: it’s the capacity-for-choice-flavored thing that humans have, dogs and AIs kind of have, flies maybe have tiny glimmers of, and plants and rocks don’t.
I assert that determinism renders free will exactly as illusory as it renders temperature!
I… don’t know how I would tell whether a given universe had that property. Same if you replace “free will” with “temperature”.
People mean different things by “free will”, which is why the question is worthy asking.
Different definitions of free will require freedom from different things. Much of the debate centres on Libertarian free will, which requires freedom from complete causal determinism (and therefore, freedom from inevitability). Libertarian free will requires leeway, or multiple possibilities at a moment in time. That’s often expressed as being able to act differently if the history if the universe were rewound. Compatibilist definitions of free will only require freedom from compulsion, and allow free will to exist in a deterministic universe . A third set of concerns is free will is a form of conscious control,top down control or initiation of action by an inner self.
Libertarian and compatibilist free will aren’t opposites. Compatibilism says you act freely and responsibly when you have a normally functioning brain , and lack external conclusion from another agent. Libertarians don’t have to reject the compatibilist criteria—it would be rather absurd that you can be free while being compelled—they just have to regard them as insufficient, because the further criterion of leeway is lacking.
Libertarian free will has sub-varieties.
One is “contra causal” free will, which requires freedom from physics, on the assumption that physics is deterministic. This is often connected with the idea of a supernatural soul, that is able to override the physics of the brain. In contrast, naturalistic libertarians seek to find free will within physics, by rejecting physical determinism; they regard indeterminism as a necessary (but perhaps not sufficient) condition of free will.
Another is that free will requires freedom from any limitation whatsoever …but that is the definition of omnipotence. It is a straw-man position which is not adopted by actual believers in free will: believers in naturalistic free will accept that they are constrained by the laws of nature. Believers in supernatural free will believe that God alone is ominipotent
The question of whether physics allows free will does not depend on physics or neurology alone: it also depends on how free will is conceptualised. It is neither a purely scientific nor a purely philosophical issue.
But whether humans have it is contentious. ..at least under the Libertarian definition.
It you think humans definitely have it , you’re siding with the compatiblist definition. Which in turn means the definition, not a discovery about the world, is doing most of the work.
Half of the talk about free will is people saying it doesn’t exist.