Does it seem like I’m missing something important if I say “Thing = Nexus” gives a “functional” explanation of what thing is, i.e. it serves the function of being an “inductive nexus of reference”. This is not a foundational/physicalist/mechanistic explanation, but it is very much a sort of explanation that I can imagine being useful in some cases/for some purposes.
I’m suggesting this as a possibly different angle at “what sort of explanation is Thing=Nexus, and why is it plausibly not fraught despite it’s somewhat-circularity?” It seems like it maps on to /doesn’t contract anything you say (note: I only skimmed the post so might have missed some relevant detail, sorry!), but I wanted to check whether, even if not conflicting, it misses something you think is or might be important somehow.
I’m not sure I understand your question at all, sorry. I’ll say my interpretation and then answer that. You might be asking:
Is the point of the essay summed up by saying: ” “Thing=Nexus” is not mechanistic/physicalist, but it’s still useful; in general, explanations can be non-mechanistic etc., but still be useful, perhaps by giving a functional definition of something.”?
My answer is no, that doesn’t sum up the essay. The essay makes these claims:
There many different directions in conceptspace that could be considered “more foundational”, each with their own usefulness and partial coherence.
None of these directions gives a total ordering that satisfies all the main needs of a “foundational direction”.
Some propositions/concepts not only fail to go in [your favorite foundational direction], but are furthermore circular; they call on themselves.
At least for all the “foundational directions” I listed, circular ideas can’t be going in that direction, because they are circular.
Nevertheless, a circular idea can be pretty useful.
I did fail to list “functional” in my list of “foundational directions”, so thanks for bringing it up. What I say about foundational directions would also apply to “functional”.
Does it seem like I’m missing something important if I say “Thing = Nexus” gives a “functional” explanation of what thing is, i.e. it serves the function of being an “inductive nexus of reference”. This is not a foundational/physicalist/mechanistic explanation, but it is very much a sort of explanation that I can imagine being useful in some cases/for some purposes.
I’m suggesting this as a possibly different angle at “what sort of explanation is Thing=Nexus, and why is it plausibly not fraught despite it’s somewhat-circularity?” It seems like it maps on to /doesn’t contract anything you say (note: I only skimmed the post so might have missed some relevant detail, sorry!), but I wanted to check whether, even if not conflicting, it misses something you think is or might be important somehow.
I’m not sure I understand your question at all, sorry. I’ll say my interpretation and then answer that. You might be asking:
My answer is no, that doesn’t sum up the essay. The essay makes these claims:
There many different directions in conceptspace that could be considered “more foundational”, each with their own usefulness and partial coherence.
None of these directions gives a total ordering that satisfies all the main needs of a “foundational direction”.
Some propositions/concepts not only fail to go in [your favorite foundational direction], but are furthermore circular; they call on themselves.
At least for all the “foundational directions” I listed, circular ideas can’t be going in that direction, because they are circular.
Nevertheless, a circular idea can be pretty useful.
I did fail to list “functional” in my list of “foundational directions”, so thanks for bringing it up. What I say about foundational directions would also apply to “functional”.