In order to believe X falsely, one has to construct a plausible-ish world where X is the case. (...) In other words, suppose you want to rationalize your belief in X.
Note that the former isn’t the same at the latter. You may believe, rationally, that you didn’t win the lottery, but, as luck would have it, you actually won, unbeknownst to you. The false belief here is not distorted at all; indeed, the true belief (that you won) would be more “distorted” (irrational) because it has a very low objective probability.
Note that the former isn’t the same at the latter. You may believe, rationally, that you didn’t win the lottery, but, as luck would have it, you actually won, unbeknownst to you. The false belief here is not distorted at all; indeed, the true belief (that you won) would be more “distorted” (irrational) because it has a very low objective probability.
In order to set out to believe falsely.
Ah yes, I delete my comment if you add this in the post.
(I don’t mind / would prefer this clarification in the comments?)