Maybe this is obvious to you, but a lot of the content on this site is about explicating common errors of logic and statistics that people might fall for. I think it’s valuable.
Thank you. Maybe I over-indexed on using the satellite example, but I thought it made for a better didactic example in part because it was so obvious. I provided the other examples to point to cases where I thought the error was less clear.
The lesson to draw from the false confidence theorem is “be careful,” not “abandon all the laws of ordinary statistics in favor of an alternative conception of uncertainty.”
This is also true. Like I said (maybe not very clearly), there’s more or less 2 solutions—use non-epistemtic belief to represent uncertainty, or avoid using epistemic uncertainty in probability calculations. (And you might even be able to sort of squeeze the former solution into Bayesian representation by always including “something I haven’t thought of” to include some of your probability mass, which I think is something Eliezer has even suggested. I haven’t thought about this part in detail.)
Thank you. Maybe I over-indexed on using the satellite example, but I thought it made for a better didactic example in part because it was so obvious. I provided the other examples to point to cases where I thought the error was less clear.
This is also true. Like I said (maybe not very clearly), there’s more or less 2 solutions—use non-epistemtic belief to represent uncertainty, or avoid using epistemic uncertainty in probability calculations. (And you might even be able to sort of squeeze the former solution into Bayesian representation by always including “something I haven’t thought of” to include some of your probability mass, which I think is something Eliezer has even suggested. I haven’t thought about this part in detail.)