Well, I actually think both definitions are kind of vague and hard to apply, and since they’re written somewhat differently my intuition is that they’re not describing the same thing by default, and if you think they are then you need to argue it.
Conditioned on “X possesses A”, the definitions seem to be “there is no possible account of A in which the only explanatory units are the constituents of X”, compared to “the constituents of X do not possess A”. I don’t think it’s obvious that these are the same.
I might guess that ant colonies have properties which are emergent by your definition but not ESR’s, but I’m not confident.
All that said, that was a fairly throwaway line, and if I was wrong about it then that doesn’t particularly change my feelings.
Well, I actually think both definitions are kind of vague and hard to apply, and since they’re written somewhat differently my intuition is that they’re not describing the same thing by default, and if you think they are then you need to argue it.
Sorry, but I don’t think that’s how burden of proof works. You’re the one claiming that the definitions are different, so you are the one who needs to defend that claim.
If you feel they are different, then provide an example.
I was wrong about it then that doesn’t particularly change my feelings.
I’m going to mostly disengage now, I expect continuing would be a waste of time. But it seems virtuous of me to answer this question, at least:
> What would change your feelings.
One thing that would change my feelings would be if someone (possibly you) looked at Eliezer’s original essay and summarized it in a way that seemed true to the spirit, and did the same with yours, and yours felt like it engaged with Eliezer’s. I’m aware that this is vague. I think that’s pretty inevitable.
Well, I actually think both definitions are kind of vague and hard to apply, and since they’re written somewhat differently my intuition is that they’re not describing the same thing by default, and if you think they are then you need to argue it.
Conditioned on “X possesses A”, the definitions seem to be “there is no possible account of A in which the only explanatory units are the constituents of X”, compared to “the constituents of X do not possess A”. I don’t think it’s obvious that these are the same.
I might guess that ant colonies have properties which are emergent by your definition but not ESR’s, but I’m not confident.
All that said, that was a fairly throwaway line, and if I was wrong about it then that doesn’t particularly change my feelings.
Sorry, but I don’t think that’s how burden of proof works. You’re the one claiming that the definitions are different, so you are the one who needs to defend that claim.
If you feel they are different, then provide an example.
What would change your feelings.
I’m going to mostly disengage now, I expect continuing would be a waste of time. But it seems virtuous of me to answer this question, at least:
> What would change your feelings.
One thing that would change my feelings would be if someone (possibly you) looked at Eliezer’s original essay and summarized it in a way that seemed true to the spirit, and did the same with yours, and yours felt like it engaged with Eliezer’s. I’m aware that this is vague. I think that’s pretty inevitable.
I think there is an obvious conflict of interest in me engaging in that particular exercise.