You’re not addressing me, as I say morality is subjective. However, even within your stated moral framework, you haven’t specified the value range of a marginal animal life. I’m extremely suspicious of arguments that someone else’s (including factory-farmed animals) are negative value. If you think that they’re lower value than other possible lives, but still positive, then the equilibrium of creating many additional lives, even with suffering, is preferable to simply having fewer animals on earth.
So yes, suffering is worse than contentment. Is it worse than never having existed at all? I don’t know, and suspect not.
Well, repugnant != incorrect, but even if I were to accept that end-state as undesirable (and I actually do), the limit doesn’t describe the current margin. It’s perfectly consistent to believe that we shouldn’t sacrifice great lives to have more mediocre lives while believing we can correctly make additional mediocre lives while keeping the great ones.
“More animals than now” is a different position than “as many animals as possible, even if we have to crowd out humans and happier animals”. I’ll argue for the first, not for the second.
You’re not addressing me, as I say morality is subjective. However, even within your stated moral framework, you haven’t specified the value range of a marginal animal life. I’m extremely suspicious of arguments that someone else’s (including factory-farmed animals) are negative value. If you think that they’re lower value than other possible lives, but still positive, then the equilibrium of creating many additional lives, even with suffering, is preferable to simply having fewer animals on earth.
So yes, suffering is worse than contentment. Is it worse than never having existed at all? I don’t know, and suspect not.
Arguing that creating lives has positive value and that therefore it is good to create them quickly leads into Repugnant Conclusion territory.
Well, repugnant != incorrect, but even if I were to accept that end-state as undesirable (and I actually do), the limit doesn’t describe the current margin. It’s perfectly consistent to believe that we shouldn’t sacrifice great lives to have more mediocre lives while believing we can correctly make additional mediocre lives while keeping the great ones.
“More animals than now” is a different position than “as many animals as possible, even if we have to crowd out humans and happier animals”. I’ll argue for the first, not for the second.