Separately from all my other comments on this topic, I’d like to mention a form of “hypocrisy” which is not best understood by treating the “hypocrite” as a hostile agent. (My reason for using the scare quotes will become clear shortly.)
Suppose I say: “Everyone should do X.” But I, myself, do not do X. This, clearly, is hypocrisy.
On the other hand, suppose I say: “People of group A should do X.” I, myself, am not in group A; and I do not do X. Is this hypocrisy? No, because my words do not imply that I should do X, and so my failure to do X does not constitute a divergence between my words and my actions.
But now suppose that it is impolitic to say “People of group A should do X.” Perhaps this is because the concept that there is this group A, which is different from people not in group A, is a politically incorrect concept. Or perhaps it’s because labeling people as belonging to group A is seen as insulting—or, relatedly, because claiming to not be a part of group A is seen as arrogant, or offensive, etc.
(Software engineering example: “Scrum is a good methodology for bad programmers.” Here the claim is that people in the group “bad programmers” should use Scrum. “And do you use Scrum?” “Of course not; I am not a bad programmer.” This is likely to raise some hackles.)
Now, one has two choices, in such a case. One may simply not make the claim at all. This avoids the problem—but wait; the original motivation for saying “People of group A should do X.” was, presumably, a sense that it’s important to cause people of group A to do X. Staying silent fails to accomplish this goal!
So, instead, one says: “Everyone should do X.” This avoids the problem of speaking in an impolitic way—but at a cost: one runs the risk of being labeled a hypocrite. (And, unfortunately, in practice—especially in cases where the “everyone should do X” rule is being proposed as a formal rule, as official policy—the result of the hypocrisy norm is that now everyone really is obliged to do X… even though X may be unhelpful, or even detrimental, to those not in group A.)
In this case, “hypocrisy” is not quite the right concept, because the alleged “hypocrite” is merely trying to avoid a flawed pattern of social status assignment (i.e. the fact that saying “People of group A should do X.” is impolitic). The “hypocrite” is genuinely trying to do good, to benefit everyone; that he has no desire to incur a social cost for doing so, is quite understandable, and not at all blameworthy. (Attempting to fight the pattern, to try to change it, would, of course, be supererogatory—but it can hardly be said to be obligatory.)
Related to all of this, of course, is the concept of “one must first know the rules, and then may break them”.
And here’s a counterpoint. I said that what I describe in the parent comment is…
a form of “hypocrisy” which is not best understood by treating the “hypocrite” as a hostile agent
But is that quite true? It seems to me that it’s true only if you accept (or would accept, if it were put to you) the truth of the original, intended, proposition (of the form “People of group A should do X.”—along with its implicature, “People not of group A need not do X.”).
Otherwise, consider the situation, seen from the viewpoint of someone to whom the “hypocrite” is speaking, and who does not (necessarily) accept that original proposition (nor its implicature):
Someone—let’s call her Alice—is claiming that “everyone should do X”. But Alice, herself, is not doing X. Upon investigation, it becomes clear to you that what Alice in fact thinks is that “people of group A should do X”; and, further, that Alice does not consider herself to be in group A, but does consider you to be in group A. But this means that Alice considers herself to be better than you, in some sense! Can you really trust Alice’s recommendations, then? Furthermore: others will surely come to the same conclusions as you have. Is it acceptable to allow Alice to flout her proposed rule, given that this, by implication, is a signal—first, that Alice is not in group A (and therefore of higher status); and second, that Alice is exempt from the rules, without even needing an explicit exemption (and that, too, is status-increasing)?
Alternatively:
Someone—let’s call her Alice—is claiming that “everyone should do X”. But Alice, herself, is not doing X. Upon investigation, it becomes clear to you that what Alice in fact thinks is that “people of group A should do X”; and, further, that Alice does not consider herself to be in group A—nor, indeed, does she consider you to be of group A… but she did not share any of these considerations with you. (Why didn’t she? Well, because that is dangerous for her; to speak in an impolitic way, even to one who may be expected to sympathize with the sentiment, is risky.) What is Alice then, but a hostile agent? If you took her words at face value, then here you’d be, doing X, to your own detriment; while Alice, hypocritically, abstains (and reaps the benefits of that abstention).
Both of these patterns are not hypothetical; they occur, with some regularity, “in the wild”. (Concrete examples might derail the thread, so I will refrain from giving any.)
The scrum example could easily be a “bad categorization” flinch, not directly about hypocrisy. It would apply even if the speaker used scrum and acknowledged that they were a bad programmer.
Separately from all my other comments on this topic, I’d like to mention a form of “hypocrisy” which is not best understood by treating the “hypocrite” as a hostile agent. (My reason for using the scare quotes will become clear shortly.)
Suppose I say: “Everyone should do X.” But I, myself, do not do X. This, clearly, is hypocrisy.
On the other hand, suppose I say: “People of group A should do X.” I, myself, am not in group A; and I do not do X. Is this hypocrisy? No, because my words do not imply that I should do X, and so my failure to do X does not constitute a divergence between my words and my actions.
But now suppose that it is impolitic to say “People of group A should do X.” Perhaps this is because the concept that there is this group A, which is different from people not in group A, is a politically incorrect concept. Or perhaps it’s because labeling people as belonging to group A is seen as insulting—or, relatedly, because claiming to not be a part of group A is seen as arrogant, or offensive, etc.
(Software engineering example: “Scrum is a good methodology for bad programmers.” Here the claim is that people in the group “bad programmers” should use Scrum. “And do you use Scrum?” “Of course not; I am not a bad programmer.” This is likely to raise some hackles.)
Now, one has two choices, in such a case. One may simply not make the claim at all. This avoids the problem—but wait; the original motivation for saying “People of group A should do X.” was, presumably, a sense that it’s important to cause people of group A to do X. Staying silent fails to accomplish this goal!
So, instead, one says: “Everyone should do X.” This avoids the problem of speaking in an impolitic way—but at a cost: one runs the risk of being labeled a hypocrite. (And, unfortunately, in practice—especially in cases where the “everyone should do X” rule is being proposed as a formal rule, as official policy—the result of the hypocrisy norm is that now everyone really is obliged to do X… even though X may be unhelpful, or even detrimental, to those not in group A.)
In this case, “hypocrisy” is not quite the right concept, because the alleged “hypocrite” is merely trying to avoid a flawed pattern of social status assignment (i.e. the fact that saying “People of group A should do X.” is impolitic). The “hypocrite” is genuinely trying to do good, to benefit everyone; that he has no desire to incur a social cost for doing so, is quite understandable, and not at all blameworthy. (Attempting to fight the pattern, to try to change it, would, of course, be supererogatory—but it can hardly be said to be obligatory.)
Related to all of this, of course, is the concept of “one must first know the rules, and then may break them”.
And here’s a counterpoint. I said that what I describe in the parent comment is…
But is that quite true? It seems to me that it’s true only if you accept (or would accept, if it were put to you) the truth of the original, intended, proposition (of the form “People of group A should do X.”—along with its implicature, “People not of group A need not do X.”).
Otherwise, consider the situation, seen from the viewpoint of someone to whom the “hypocrite” is speaking, and who does not (necessarily) accept that original proposition (nor its implicature):
Someone—let’s call her Alice—is claiming that “everyone should do X”. But Alice, herself, is not doing X. Upon investigation, it becomes clear to you that what Alice in fact thinks is that “people of group A should do X”; and, further, that Alice does not consider herself to be in group A, but does consider you to be in group A. But this means that Alice considers herself to be better than you, in some sense! Can you really trust Alice’s recommendations, then? Furthermore: others will surely come to the same conclusions as you have. Is it acceptable to allow Alice to flout her proposed rule, given that this, by implication, is a signal—first, that Alice is not in group A (and therefore of higher status); and second, that Alice is exempt from the rules, without even needing an explicit exemption (and that, too, is status-increasing)?
Alternatively:
Someone—let’s call her Alice—is claiming that “everyone should do X”. But Alice, herself, is not doing X. Upon investigation, it becomes clear to you that what Alice in fact thinks is that “people of group A should do X”; and, further, that Alice does not consider herself to be in group A—nor, indeed, does she consider you to be of group A… but she did not share any of these considerations with you. (Why didn’t she? Well, because that is dangerous for her; to speak in an impolitic way, even to one who may be expected to sympathize with the sentiment, is risky.) What is Alice then, but a hostile agent? If you took her words at face value, then here you’d be, doing X, to your own detriment; while Alice, hypocritically, abstains (and reaps the benefits of that abstention).
Both of these patterns are not hypothetical; they occur, with some regularity, “in the wild”. (Concrete examples might derail the thread, so I will refrain from giving any.)
The scrum example could easily be a “bad categorization” flinch, not directly about hypocrisy. It would apply even if the speaker used scrum and acknowledged that they were a bad programmer.