I personally knew someone who has done that, so the example’s not completely off the mark. He wasn’t Mormon, and he posited pedophilia rather than torture, but he was pretty persistent about it.
I suspect most theists aren’t so obnoxious as to actually say that kind of thing, whether they think it or not, so it’s hard to guesstimate frequency, but it’s not un-heard of.
I suspect most theists aren’t so obnoxious as to actually say that kind of thing, whether they think it or not, so it’s hard to guesstimate frequency, but it’s not un-heard of.
I agree completely. I know there are some that act this way (I knew them) but I still say that the jump is a foolish and irrational one. The argument is that is appealing to someone’s sense of morality by arguing that “if God was not true than this evil, horrible, thing is not evil or horrible.” But, if by their own words, their morality comes from God and God alone, than their gut reaction is evidence that something is amiss. Their intuition is clashing with the nasty evil, not God’s laws.
If God is the root of morality...
… but when you imagine no God you see all sorts of evil prevail
Then God is not the root of morality...
… or the evil is no longer evil and your predictor is broken
The argument tries to have its cake and eat it, too. Because of this, I do not consider this statement from the original post to be correct:
What if I said this: “If God was not true than skipping communion would be okay.” Would anyone complain? No, because that particular rule is one directly attached to God. Eating babies is probably not. If I took the average theist and poofed away all belief in God, they would probably still think eating babies is wrong. They would have no idea why, but they would still think it is wrong.
When you say you don’t believe in God, she thinks you’re saying, ‘it’s OK to torture babies’. What’s scary is that she’s somewhat justified here: without an externally applied ethical belief system, individual ethics can vary widely from what she accepts as ethical (and what you accept as ethical).
Widely varying does not imply “think of a nasty did and say it is okay.” The appropriate question would be “If God does not exist, from where does morality stem? I cannot imagine myself condoning these nasty evil things.” If none of the responses seem correct, then I would be more sympathetic toward Wednesday’s response. It is the jump straight to this conclusion that I find disapproving.
I’m not sure you (a) disapprove of the theists that jump to this conclusion, or (b) if you disapprove of my post claiming that theists do this, or if (c) you are disapproving of my rhetorical technique of using a very extreme example about torturing babies.
If (a): Agreed. Many theists educated on this topic (for example, those that have taken an ethics course) agree that morality does not depend on God.
If (b): It is a very common theist objection to atheism, possibly the most common one.
For example, the first two paragraphs pasted from here:
Although Plato demonstrated the logical independence of God and morality over 2,000 years ago in the Euthyphro, the belief that morality requires God remains a widely held moral maxim. In particular, it serves as the basic assumption of the Christian fundamentalist’s social theory. Fundamentalists claim that all of society’s ills—everything from AIDS to out-of-wedlock pregnancies—are the result of a breakdown in morality and that this breakdown is due to a decline in the belief of God. Although many fundamentalists trace the beginning of this decline to the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859, others trace it to the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision banning prayer in the classroom. In an attempt to neutralize these purported sources of moral decay, fundamentalists across America are seeking to restore belief in God by promoting the teaching of creationism and school prayer.
The belief that morality requires God is not limited to theists, however. Many atheists subscribe to it as well. The existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, says that “If God is dead, everything is permitted.” In other words, if there is no supreme being to lay down the moral law, each individual is free to do as he or she pleases. Without a divine lawgiver, there can be no universal moral law.
The view that God creates the moral law is often called the “Divine Command Theory of Ethics.” According to this view, what makes an action right is that God wills it to be done. That an agnostic should find this theory suspect is obvious, for, if one doesn’t believe in God or if one is unsure which God is the true God, being told that one must do as God commands will not help one solve any moral dilemmas. What is not so obvious is that theists should find this theory suspect, too, for it is inconsistent with a belief in God. The upshot is that both the fundamentalists and the existentialists are mistaken about what morality requires.
If (c), I don’t mind the criticism, I will weight the probability that it was an ineffective rhetorical technique. It was my intention to overstate the case – obviously theists aren’t worried that atheists are literally torturing babies or that they themselves would do that if they converted. It’s an extreme example just to explain how theists equivocate a challenge of their faith with a challenge of morality itself, because they imagine their faith explains morality. I used this technique because I wouldn’t have been very good at a precise description – thus signaling that my tone and approach is somewhat flippant/rough. Further, signaling that Wednesday is an extreme, hypothetical example, because I would get in trouble if I tried to say anything general about all theists.
I don’t think you’re doing justice to Sartre. He was pointing out exactly what you did—that most theists seem to believe in divine command theory, and so we should expect some sort of moral crisis if common people stop believing in God.
By the way, I like how you split the responses up. I think it helps solve any confusions.
(a) I am saying this and we agree, so cool.
(b) I agree that people do use this. I also understand the reason they do so (having used it myself at one point in my life).
(c) Specifically, this part of your post is what I disagree with:
When you say you don’t believe in God, she thinks you’re saying, ‘it’s OK to torture babies’. What’s scary is that she’s somewhat justified here: without an externally applied ethical belief system, individual ethics can vary widely from what she accepts as ethical (and what you accept as ethical).
I am saying she is not justified there. Switching the example to something less extreme does not make it more justified.
Perhaps I am focusing on what was intended to be a minor point. I do not mean to make a mountain out of a molehill.
I see: I believe you are saying that Wednesday is not justified in being afraid that if God doesn’t exist she will do something that is wrong because she should make the following deduction:
Either morality (i) depends on God or (ii) it doesn’t.
(i) If morality depends on God, and he doesn’t exist, then there’s no evil to worry about.
(ii) If morality doesn’t depend on God, and he doesn’t exist, then morality is unaffected.
Technically, I meant that when I say “God does not exist” it does not imply anything about morality. Whether Wednesday associates God with morality is irrelevant and the reason for this irrelevance is your (i) and (ii) tree explanation.
God exists and there is an absolute moral authority.
God doesn’t exist and there is no morality.
God exists and morality is individually determined.
You, as an atheist, are reconciled with (3) but surely Wednesday would think this was a demotion of morality. Remember, she is worried that something she considers wrong will become “OK”—as you pointed out, she’ll still consider it wrong for her—but now she must accept that it may not be universally wrong … the evil thing may be OK for someone else. This isn’t merely confusing. What’s really going on is she doesn’t believe that she has any authority to define morality. Humans are equal so in a clash of ethical positions, she’s afraid she’ll have to defer or compromise her morality.
I defend Wednesday here, as though she is justified, but at the end of the day we know everything works out OK.
I personally knew someone who has done that, so the example’s not completely off the mark. He wasn’t Mormon, and he posited pedophilia rather than torture, but he was pretty persistent about it.
I suspect most theists aren’t so obnoxious as to actually say that kind of thing, whether they think it or not, so it’s hard to guesstimate frequency, but it’s not un-heard of.
I agree completely. I know there are some that act this way (I knew them) but I still say that the jump is a foolish and irrational one. The argument is that is appealing to someone’s sense of morality by arguing that “if God was not true than this evil, horrible, thing is not evil or horrible.” But, if by their own words, their morality comes from God and God alone, than their gut reaction is evidence that something is amiss. Their intuition is clashing with the nasty evil, not God’s laws.
If God is the root of morality...
… but when you imagine no God you see all sorts of evil prevail
Then God is not the root of morality...
… or the evil is no longer evil and your predictor is broken
The argument tries to have its cake and eat it, too. Because of this, I do not consider this statement from the original post to be correct:
What if I said this: “If God was not true than skipping communion would be okay.” Would anyone complain? No, because that particular rule is one directly attached to God. Eating babies is probably not. If I took the average theist and poofed away all belief in God, they would probably still think eating babies is wrong. They would have no idea why, but they would still think it is wrong.
Widely varying does not imply “think of a nasty did and say it is okay.” The appropriate question would be “If God does not exist, from where does morality stem? I cannot imagine myself condoning these nasty evil things.” If none of the responses seem correct, then I would be more sympathetic toward Wednesday’s response. It is the jump straight to this conclusion that I find disapproving.
I’m not sure you (a) disapprove of the theists that jump to this conclusion, or (b) if you disapprove of my post claiming that theists do this, or if (c) you are disapproving of my rhetorical technique of using a very extreme example about torturing babies.
If (a): Agreed. Many theists educated on this topic (for example, those that have taken an ethics course) agree that morality does not depend on God.
If (b): It is a very common theist objection to atheism, possibly the most common one.
For example, the first two paragraphs pasted from here:
Although Plato demonstrated the logical independence of God and morality over 2,000 years ago in the Euthyphro, the belief that morality requires God remains a widely held moral maxim. In particular, it serves as the basic assumption of the Christian fundamentalist’s social theory. Fundamentalists claim that all of society’s ills—everything from AIDS to out-of-wedlock pregnancies—are the result of a breakdown in morality and that this breakdown is due to a decline in the belief of God. Although many fundamentalists trace the beginning of this decline to the publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species in 1859, others trace it to the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision banning prayer in the classroom. In an attempt to neutralize these purported sources of moral decay, fundamentalists across America are seeking to restore belief in God by promoting the teaching of creationism and school prayer.
The belief that morality requires God is not limited to theists, however. Many atheists subscribe to it as well. The existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, says that “If God is dead, everything is permitted.” In other words, if there is no supreme being to lay down the moral law, each individual is free to do as he or she pleases. Without a divine lawgiver, there can be no universal moral law.
The view that God creates the moral law is often called the “Divine Command Theory of Ethics.” According to this view, what makes an action right is that God wills it to be done. That an agnostic should find this theory suspect is obvious, for, if one doesn’t believe in God or if one is unsure which God is the true God, being told that one must do as God commands will not help one solve any moral dilemmas. What is not so obvious is that theists should find this theory suspect, too, for it is inconsistent with a belief in God. The upshot is that both the fundamentalists and the existentialists are mistaken about what morality requires.
If (c), I don’t mind the criticism, I will weight the probability that it was an ineffective rhetorical technique. It was my intention to overstate the case – obviously theists aren’t worried that atheists are literally torturing babies or that they themselves would do that if they converted. It’s an extreme example just to explain how theists equivocate a challenge of their faith with a challenge of morality itself, because they imagine their faith explains morality. I used this technique because I wouldn’t have been very good at a precise description – thus signaling that my tone and approach is somewhat flippant/rough. Further, signaling that Wednesday is an extreme, hypothetical example, because I would get in trouble if I tried to say anything general about all theists.
I don’t think you’re doing justice to Sartre. He was pointing out exactly what you did—that most theists seem to believe in divine command theory, and so we should expect some sort of moral crisis if common people stop believing in God.
By the way, I like how you split the responses up. I think it helps solve any confusions.
(a) I am saying this and we agree, so cool.
(b) I agree that people do use this. I also understand the reason they do so (having used it myself at one point in my life).
(c) Specifically, this part of your post is what I disagree with:
I am saying she is not justified there. Switching the example to something less extreme does not make it more justified.
Perhaps I am focusing on what was intended to be a minor point. I do not mean to make a mountain out of a molehill.
I see: I believe you are saying that Wednesday is not justified in being afraid that if God doesn’t exist she will do something that is wrong because she should make the following deduction:
Either morality (i) depends on God or (ii) it doesn’t.
(i) If morality depends on God, and he doesn’t exist, then there’s no evil to worry about.
(ii) If morality doesn’t depend on God, and he doesn’t exist, then morality is unaffected.
Technically, I meant that when I say “God does not exist” it does not imply anything about morality. Whether Wednesday associates God with morality is irrelevant and the reason for this irrelevance is your (i) and (ii) tree explanation.
Great, I think we’re making good progress.
Here are three possibilities for Wednesday:
God exists and there is an absolute moral authority.
God doesn’t exist and there is no morality.
God exists and morality is individually determined.
You, as an atheist, are reconciled with (3) but surely Wednesday would think this was a demotion of morality. Remember, she is worried that something she considers wrong will become “OK”—as you pointed out, she’ll still consider it wrong for her—but now she must accept that it may not be universally wrong … the evil thing may be OK for someone else. This isn’t merely confusing. What’s really going on is she doesn’t believe that she has any authority to define morality. Humans are equal so in a clash of ethical positions, she’s afraid she’ll have to defer or compromise her morality.
I defend Wednesday here, as though she is justified, but at the end of the day we know everything works out OK.