By the way, I like how you split the responses up. I think it helps solve any confusions.
(a) I am saying this and we agree, so cool.
(b) I agree that people do use this. I also understand the reason they do so (having used it myself at one point in my life).
(c) Specifically, this part of your post is what I disagree with:
When you say you don’t believe in God, she thinks you’re saying, ‘it’s OK to torture babies’. What’s scary is that she’s somewhat justified here: without an externally applied ethical belief system, individual ethics can vary widely from what she accepts as ethical (and what you accept as ethical).
I am saying she is not justified there. Switching the example to something less extreme does not make it more justified.
Perhaps I am focusing on what was intended to be a minor point. I do not mean to make a mountain out of a molehill.
I see: I believe you are saying that Wednesday is not justified in being afraid that if God doesn’t exist she will do something that is wrong because she should make the following deduction:
Either morality (i) depends on God or (ii) it doesn’t.
(i) If morality depends on God, and he doesn’t exist, then there’s no evil to worry about.
(ii) If morality doesn’t depend on God, and he doesn’t exist, then morality is unaffected.
Technically, I meant that when I say “God does not exist” it does not imply anything about morality. Whether Wednesday associates God with morality is irrelevant and the reason for this irrelevance is your (i) and (ii) tree explanation.
God exists and there is an absolute moral authority.
God doesn’t exist and there is no morality.
God exists and morality is individually determined.
You, as an atheist, are reconciled with (3) but surely Wednesday would think this was a demotion of morality. Remember, she is worried that something she considers wrong will become “OK”—as you pointed out, she’ll still consider it wrong for her—but now she must accept that it may not be universally wrong … the evil thing may be OK for someone else. This isn’t merely confusing. What’s really going on is she doesn’t believe that she has any authority to define morality. Humans are equal so in a clash of ethical positions, she’s afraid she’ll have to defer or compromise her morality.
I defend Wednesday here, as though she is justified, but at the end of the day we know everything works out OK.
By the way, I like how you split the responses up. I think it helps solve any confusions.
(a) I am saying this and we agree, so cool.
(b) I agree that people do use this. I also understand the reason they do so (having used it myself at one point in my life).
(c) Specifically, this part of your post is what I disagree with:
I am saying she is not justified there. Switching the example to something less extreme does not make it more justified.
Perhaps I am focusing on what was intended to be a minor point. I do not mean to make a mountain out of a molehill.
I see: I believe you are saying that Wednesday is not justified in being afraid that if God doesn’t exist she will do something that is wrong because she should make the following deduction:
Either morality (i) depends on God or (ii) it doesn’t.
(i) If morality depends on God, and he doesn’t exist, then there’s no evil to worry about.
(ii) If morality doesn’t depend on God, and he doesn’t exist, then morality is unaffected.
Technically, I meant that when I say “God does not exist” it does not imply anything about morality. Whether Wednesday associates God with morality is irrelevant and the reason for this irrelevance is your (i) and (ii) tree explanation.
Great, I think we’re making good progress.
Here are three possibilities for Wednesday:
God exists and there is an absolute moral authority.
God doesn’t exist and there is no morality.
God exists and morality is individually determined.
You, as an atheist, are reconciled with (3) but surely Wednesday would think this was a demotion of morality. Remember, she is worried that something she considers wrong will become “OK”—as you pointed out, she’ll still consider it wrong for her—but now she must accept that it may not be universally wrong … the evil thing may be OK for someone else. This isn’t merely confusing. What’s really going on is she doesn’t believe that she has any authority to define morality. Humans are equal so in a clash of ethical positions, she’s afraid she’ll have to defer or compromise her morality.
I defend Wednesday here, as though she is justified, but at the end of the day we know everything works out OK.