I think it’s counter to the spirit of rationalist discourse to ban the hypothesis that someone is racist. Rationalism is about following the evidence wherever it leads, not about keeping people’s feelings from being hurt.
The problem is not simply the accusation of being racist. The problem is the accusation of being racist, in response to an empirical claim, as a substitute for addressing the empirical claim (and with the implication that the accusation constitutes a sufficient reply to the empirical claim).
Suppose that I say “Jews are more greedy than Gentiles; this is established by the following studies”. Now consider the following possible responses:
“You’re an antisemite.”
“You are [ mistaken / lying / wrong / otherwise making a false claim ], which I know because [ the studies have poor methodology / they don’t replicate / the operationalization makes no sense / publication bias / etc. ].”
“You are [ mistaken / lying / wrong / otherwise making a false claim ], but I have no evidence to back up this disagreement, nor can I provide any good reason to reject the evidence you offer; nevertheless, I claim that you are wrong.”
“You are [ mistaken / lying / wrong / otherwise making a false claim ] (which I know because [reasons, as above]); also you’re an antisemite (which I conclude from the fact that you have made this false claim, and other similar evidence).”
Reply #2 is clearly “in the spirit of rationalist discourse”.
Reply #3 is epistemically void—we can and should dismiss it as a basically contentless utterance for the purpose of the object-level discussion (but perhaps it is useful for its author to publicly stake out the position in question, and it provides a data point on the question of “what and how do people think about this topic”). But on the meta level it is at least honest, neither making any unjustified claims nor subverting the discussion itself.
Reply #4 is like reply #2, but with the added claim (accusation) of antisemitism. Is that claim “in the spirit of rationalist discourse”? Eh. It would be counter to that spirit to ban the hypothesis, sure, but what is it actually adding? We seem (in this hypothetical scenario) to be doing fine discussing the object-level issue, so what’s the point of bringing accusations of racial animus into it? Then again, perhaps the question is important for other (social) reasons, so, sure, why not allow it. (But, as
with any accusation of some serious personal failing, it ought not be made lightly, and must be well-supported—otherwise, it is the accuser who has transgressed.)
But what the hell is reply #1?
It doesn’t address the empirical claim at all. If we’re talking about “the spirit of rationalist discourse”—well, that spirit has been well and truly violated already, in this case. What’s more, the accusation of antisemitism can’t be supported by the evidence of the accused having made the false empirical claim… because the accuser has not even troubled himself to establish that the empirical claim is false! This sort of reply is strictly an attempt to shut down the conversation.
If it’s “the spirit of rationalist discourse” that concerns you, then something like #1 should be the very last sort of reply that you ever find yourself making.
“Jews are more greedy than Gentiles; this is established by the following studies” can be blameworthily antisemitic even if the studies do show that this is true on average. Some ways this can be true -
bringing it up where not relevant, e.g. to criticize a Jewish politician
saying it in a way where you’re clearly oozing contempt about Jews
making it sound like this is an essential trait of all Jews vs. all non-Jews
bringing it up weirdly often
In all these cases it can be appropriate to object to that regardless of the validity of the studies.
Perhaps, perhaps. And do you have any examples of such facts (i.e., true claims) the mentioning of which is sometimes blameworthily racist/antisemitic/etc.?
(Presumably “Jews are more greedy than Gentiles” isn’t such a fact. Or is it, do you think? I am not aware of this actually being established by studies, but perhaps I am wrong about this?)
I ask, of course, because I am skeptical of this notion that the truth of the claim might be admitted by both sides, with only its “appropriateness” being, by itself, evidence of racial animus. It’s very convenient to be able to declare that “it’s not what you’re saying, it’s how [or when or why or how often] you’re saying it”. One notices that, somehow, those who make such declarations never quite get around to investigating the “what”. It’s never the right time, the right context, etc. (Meanwhile, with claims that are favored by such people, it always seems to be the right time and place and context.)
So, what’s an example (better yet, three examples) of such a thing? A true fact, which is sometimes inappropriate to bring up, because doing so would be racist, antisemitic, etc.?
Many of the truly radioactive claims I have not really investigated the truth of so cannot give as examples, but this does not mean I claim they are necessarily false either.
That said, of things I am pretty confident are true -
“Men are stronger than women.”—very true on a population level; typically not relevant to bring up in e.g. a discussion of voting rights; not appropriate to bring up to imply men are better than women
“Men are more physically aggressive than women.”—also true on a pouplation level, also not relevant to bring up in e.g. a discussion of voting rights; not appropriate to bring up to imply women are better than men
“Being fat is generally bad for your health.”—true, not relevant to bring up e.g. in response to an objection to fat people being bullied or discriminated against, not appropriate to bring up to imply fat people are contemptible
“Trans people are likelier to be mentally ill than cis people.”—true, not relevant to bring up e.g. in a discussion of discrimination against trans people, not appropriate to bring up to imply trans people are all delusional/contemptible
Many of the truly radioactive claims I have not really investigated the truth of
And this doesn’t strike you as being at all suspicious? You judge some claims to be “truly radioactive”, and you haven’t even checked whether they are true? (What, do you think that a topic being “truly radioactive” makes it less likely to be relevant to real-world outcomes?) But never mind that, let’s move on.
The first three claims you list are either politically anodyne or else have the valence of the dominant political faction. And one basically never sees anyone condemned and targeted for shunning on the basis of having such beliefs.
As for the fourth claim—of course it is relevant to bring this up in a discussion of discrimination against trans people! How could it possibly not be? (What, does discrimination against mentally ill people suddenly not exist? Or do you think that no trans person has ever been discriminated against for being mentally ill?) In general, serious mental illness has a pervasive effect on everything about a person’s life. To conclude that someone being mentally ill is not relevant at all to discussion of some major aspect of a person’s life should be quite surprising.
And this illustrates the larger point. Discussing “appropriateness” rather than truth is, in almost situations like this, injurious to our truth-seeking efforts. (Deliberately so, of course.)
I mean “radioactive” in a descriptive political sense. I agree that truth claims ought not be radioactive in this sense and it is a bad thing about the political landscape than they are.
(What, does discrimination against mentally ill people suddenly not exist? Or do you think that no trans person has ever been discriminated against for being mentally ill?)
Yes, trans people can be discriminated against for being mentally ill. What I meant was that if someone says “trans people are often discriminated against and that’s bad” you should not respond with “well, trans people are mentally ill, what do you expect” as though (a) that’s universally true of trans people (b) that means the discrimination is justified.
(Additionally, I claim you could have understood that this was what I meant, by applying a modicum of interpretive labor and using mental motions like “I am confused about why someone would say this, can I try to build a model where it makes sense / pass their ITT internally”. My impression is that you are going around spamming attempted gotchas and refusing to engage even the slightest flexibility towards attempting to understand the views of people you think you disagree with; this is pretty annoying and bad for your truthseeking.)
The first three claims you list are either politically anodyne or else have the valence of the dominant political faction. And one basically never sees anyone condemned and targeted for shunning on the basis of having such beliefs.
Okay first of all, I have spent a fair bit of time in discourse contexts where they’re not really anodyne. But more importantly, …and??? I answered the question you asked (in a tone of confident assumption I would not be able to produce an answer)! I thought maybe you wanted existence proofs of me actually believing that saying a true thing can be bad rather than using that as a smokescreen for some reason, and I provided that even though it was a deeply obnoxious ask?
(Actually that would be a weird smokescreen. The type of person who I think you’re gesturing at would never want to admit that a radioactive claim might possibly be true and if anything might end up using smokescreens to try to avoid admitting that.)
I mean “radioactive” in a descriptive political sense.
… yes, obviously. (How else could you have meant it? What did you think I understood you to be saying…?)
I agree that truth claims ought not be radioactive in this sense and it is a bad thing about the political landscape than they are.
This is all very good, and yet you still haven’t checked whether said claims are true. So what is this opinion (that “truth claims ought not be radioactive in this sense”, etc.) worth, exactly?
Yes, trans people can be discriminated against for being mentally ill. What I meant was that if someone says “trans people are often discriminated against and that’s bad” you should not respond with “well, trans people are mentally ill, what do you expect” as though (a) that’s universally true of trans people (b) that means the discrimination is justified.
Yes, once again, this is just what I assumed that you meant…
But that response makes perfect sense! Yes, one should indeed expect that a population with a substantially above-average prevalence of mental illness will experience substantially above-average discrimination. What in the world does it have to do with anything being “justified”…? Nor is there any implication of universality.
(So your parenthetical is unjustified; I understood you just fine, as you see. I simply disagree.)
I answered the question you asked (in a tone of confident assumption I would not be able to produce an answer)! I thought maybe you wanted existence proofs of me actually believing that saying a true thing can be bad rather than using that as a smokescreen for some reason
To which point it surely is relevant that you (I claim) did not, in fact, produce an answer.
(Possibly you disagree. But then that’s the disagreement, right? Whether your answer was, in fact, sufficient to answer the question. You will agree, at least, that there can be disagreement on this point, yes?)
I wrote:
I ask, of course, because I am skeptical of this notion that the truth of the claim might be admitted by both sides, with only its “appropriateness” being, by itself, evidence of racial animus.
And your examples reinforce, rather than undermining, this skepticism.
The type of person who I think you’re gesturing at would never want to admit that a radioactive claim might possibly be true and if anything might end up using smokescreens to try to avoid admitting that.
You don’t see any connection whatsoever between this description and your comments about how some claims are “radioactive” and you haven’t investigated them?
The claim cubefox made was that eukaryote disliked Cremieux for saying things outside the overton window. By clarifying that she instead disliked Cremieux for being racist (and just generally interpersonally unpleasant) eukaryote was not dodging the point but directly addressing it.
Come now, you are being obtuse. What is the reason why eukaryote claims that Cremieux is racist? It’s his empirical claims, according to eukaryote herself.
According to eukaryote herself, it is not the fact that his claims are outside the overton window are not the reason she dislikes them, but rather that they are racist. I don’t think I am being obtuse; I think you’re pretending the two are synonymous.
I’m saying that it is a serious accusation, whose consequences are far more impactful (e.g. possible career end) than ones feelings being hurt. So one should be extra careful before making the accusation. In case of Cremieux we know that he is in fact defending an empirical hypothesis, and he has provided an extensive amount of evidence and arguments in its favor (e.g. on his blog). This provides strong reason to think that the accusation of racism is not justified.
I think it’s counter to the spirit of rationalist discourse to ban the hypothesis that someone is racist. Rationalism is about following the evidence wherever it leads, not about keeping people’s feelings from being hurt.
The problem is not simply the accusation of being racist. The problem is the accusation of being racist, in response to an empirical claim, as a substitute for addressing the empirical claim (and with the implication that the accusation constitutes a sufficient reply to the empirical claim).
Suppose that I say “Jews are more greedy than Gentiles; this is established by the following studies”. Now consider the following possible responses:
“You’re an antisemite.”
“You are [ mistaken / lying / wrong / otherwise making a false claim ], which I know because [ the studies have poor methodology / they don’t replicate / the operationalization makes no sense / publication bias / etc. ].”
“You are [ mistaken / lying / wrong / otherwise making a false claim ], but I have no evidence to back up this disagreement, nor can I provide any good reason to reject the evidence you offer; nevertheless, I claim that you are wrong.”
“You are [ mistaken / lying / wrong / otherwise making a false claim ] (which I know because [reasons, as above]); also you’re an antisemite (which I conclude from the fact that you have made this false claim, and other similar evidence).”
Reply #2 is clearly “in the spirit of rationalist discourse”.
Reply #3 is epistemically void—we can and should dismiss it as a basically contentless utterance for the purpose of the object-level discussion (but perhaps it is useful for its author to publicly stake out the position in question, and it provides a data point on the question of “what and how do people think about this topic”). But on the meta level it is at least honest, neither making any unjustified claims nor subverting the discussion itself.
Reply #4 is like reply #2, but with the added claim (accusation) of antisemitism. Is that claim “in the spirit of rationalist discourse”? Eh. It would be counter to that spirit to ban the hypothesis, sure, but what is it actually adding? We seem (in this hypothetical scenario) to be doing fine discussing the object-level issue, so what’s the point of bringing accusations of racial animus into it? Then again, perhaps the question is important for other (social) reasons, so, sure, why not allow it. (But, as with any accusation of some serious personal failing, it ought not be made lightly, and must be well-supported—otherwise, it is the accuser who has transgressed.)
But what the hell is reply #1?
It doesn’t address the empirical claim at all. If we’re talking about “the spirit of rationalist discourse”—well, that spirit has been well and truly violated already, in this case. What’s more, the accusation of antisemitism can’t be supported by the evidence of the accused having made the false empirical claim… because the accuser has not even troubled himself to establish that the empirical claim is false! This sort of reply is strictly an attempt to shut down the conversation.
If it’s “the spirit of rationalist discourse” that concerns you, then something like #1 should be the very last sort of reply that you ever find yourself making.
“Jews are more greedy than Gentiles; this is established by the following studies” can be blameworthily antisemitic even if the studies do show that this is true on average. Some ways this can be true -
bringing it up where not relevant, e.g. to criticize a Jewish politician
saying it in a way where you’re clearly oozing contempt about Jews
making it sound like this is an essential trait of all Jews vs. all non-Jews
bringing it up weirdly often
In all these cases it can be appropriate to object to that regardless of the validity of the studies.
Perhaps, perhaps. And do you have any examples of such facts (i.e., true claims) the mentioning of which is sometimes blameworthily racist/antisemitic/etc.?
(Presumably “Jews are more greedy than Gentiles” isn’t such a fact. Or is it, do you think? I am not aware of this actually being established by studies, but perhaps I am wrong about this?)
I ask, of course, because I am skeptical of this notion that the truth of the claim might be admitted by both sides, with only its “appropriateness” being, by itself, evidence of racial animus. It’s very convenient to be able to declare that “it’s not what you’re saying, it’s how [or when or why or how often] you’re saying it”. One notices that, somehow, those who make such declarations never quite get around to investigating the “what”. It’s never the right time, the right context, etc. (Meanwhile, with claims that are favored by such people, it always seems to be the right time and place and context.)
So, what’s an example (better yet, three examples) of such a thing? A true fact, which is sometimes inappropriate to bring up, because doing so would be racist, antisemitic, etc.?
Many of the truly radioactive claims I have not really investigated the truth of so cannot give as examples, but this does not mean I claim they are necessarily false either.
That said, of things I am pretty confident are true -
“Men are stronger than women.”—very true on a population level; typically not relevant to bring up in e.g. a discussion of voting rights; not appropriate to bring up to imply men are better than women
“Men are more physically aggressive than women.”—also true on a pouplation level, also not relevant to bring up in e.g. a discussion of voting rights; not appropriate to bring up to imply women are better than men
“Being fat is generally bad for your health.”—true, not relevant to bring up e.g. in response to an objection to fat people being bullied or discriminated against, not appropriate to bring up to imply fat people are contemptible
“Trans people are likelier to be mentally ill than cis people.”—true, not relevant to bring up e.g. in a discussion of discrimination against trans people, not appropriate to bring up to imply trans people are all delusional/contemptible
And this doesn’t strike you as being at all suspicious? You judge some claims to be “truly radioactive”, and you haven’t even checked whether they are true? (What, do you think that a topic being “truly radioactive” makes it less likely to be relevant to real-world outcomes?) But never mind that, let’s move on.
The first three claims you list are either politically anodyne or else have the valence of the dominant political faction. And one basically never sees anyone condemned and targeted for shunning on the basis of having such beliefs.
As for the fourth claim—of course it is relevant to bring this up in a discussion of discrimination against trans people! How could it possibly not be? (What, does discrimination against mentally ill people suddenly not exist? Or do you think that no trans person has ever been discriminated against for being mentally ill?) In general, serious mental illness has a pervasive effect on everything about a person’s life. To conclude that someone being mentally ill is not relevant at all to discussion of some major aspect of a person’s life should be quite surprising.
And this illustrates the larger point. Discussing “appropriateness” rather than truth is, in almost situations like this, injurious to our truth-seeking efforts. (Deliberately so, of course.)
I mean “radioactive” in a descriptive political sense. I agree that truth claims ought not be radioactive in this sense and it is a bad thing about the political landscape than they are.
Yes, trans people can be discriminated against for being mentally ill. What I meant was that if someone says “trans people are often discriminated against and that’s bad” you should not respond with “well, trans people are mentally ill, what do you expect” as though (a) that’s universally true of trans people (b) that means the discrimination is justified.
(Additionally, I claim you could have understood that this was what I meant, by applying a modicum of interpretive labor and using mental motions like “I am confused about why someone would say this, can I try to build a model where it makes sense / pass their ITT internally”. My impression is that you are going around spamming attempted gotchas and refusing to engage even the slightest flexibility towards attempting to understand the views of people you think you disagree with; this is pretty annoying and bad for your truthseeking.)
Okay first of all, I have spent a fair bit of time in discourse contexts where they’re not really anodyne. But more importantly, …and??? I answered the question you asked (in a tone of confident assumption I would not be able to produce an answer)! I thought maybe you wanted existence proofs of me actually believing that saying a true thing can be bad rather than using that as a smokescreen for some reason, and I provided that even though it was a deeply obnoxious ask?
(Actually that would be a weird smokescreen. The type of person who I think you’re gesturing at would never want to admit that a radioactive claim might possibly be true and if anything might end up using smokescreens to try to avoid admitting that.)
… yes, obviously. (How else could you have meant it? What did you think I understood you to be saying…?)
This is all very good, and yet you still haven’t checked whether said claims are true. So what is this opinion (that “truth claims ought not be radioactive in this sense”, etc.) worth, exactly?
Yes, once again, this is just what I assumed that you meant…
But that response makes perfect sense! Yes, one should indeed expect that a population with a substantially above-average prevalence of mental illness will experience substantially above-average discrimination. What in the world does it have to do with anything being “justified”…? Nor is there any implication of universality.
(So your parenthetical is unjustified; I understood you just fine, as you see. I simply disagree.)
To which point it surely is relevant that you (I claim) did not, in fact, produce an answer.
(Possibly you disagree. But then that’s the disagreement, right? Whether your answer was, in fact, sufficient to answer the question. You will agree, at least, that there can be disagreement on this point, yes?)
I wrote:
And your examples reinforce, rather than undermining, this skepticism.
You don’t see any connection whatsoever between this description and your comments about how some claims are “radioactive” and you haven’t investigated them?
The claim cubefox made was that eukaryote disliked Cremieux for saying things outside the overton window. By clarifying that she instead disliked Cremieux for being racist (and just generally interpersonally unpleasant) eukaryote was not dodging the point but directly addressing it.
Come now, you are being obtuse. What is the reason why eukaryote claims that Cremieux is racist? It’s his empirical claims, according to eukaryote herself.
According to eukaryote herself, it is not the fact that his claims are outside the overton window are not the reason she dislikes them, but rather that they are racist. I don’t think I am being obtuse; I think you’re pretending the two are synonymous.
…?
This reply seems like a non sequitur. How is it at all responsive to what I wrote?
I’m saying that it is a serious accusation, whose consequences are far more impactful (e.g. possible career end) than ones feelings being hurt. So one should be extra careful before making the accusation. In case of Cremieux we know that he is in fact defending an empirical hypothesis, and he has provided an extensive amount of evidence and arguments in its favor (e.g. on his blog). This provides strong reason to think that the accusation of racism is not justified.