This seems a bit motte-and-bailey. In your post, you argue for Bayesianism as a theory of reasoning. Of course you can say that problems that you can’t solve well with Bayesianism aren’t well posed inference problems. Unfortunately, nature doesn’t care about posing well posed inference problems.
Even if Bayesianism is better for a small subject of reasoning problems that doesn’t imply that it’s good to reject tool-boxism.
This seems a bit motte-and-bailey. In your post, you argue for Bayesianism as a theory of reasoning. Of course you can say that problems that you can’t solve well with Bayesianism aren’t well posed inference problems. Unfortunately, nature doesn’t care about posing well posed inference problems.
Even if Bayesianism is better for a small subject of reasoning problems that doesn’t imply that it’s good to reject tool-boxism.
Yep. If Bayes only does one thing. you need other tools to do the other jobs. Which, by the way, implies nothing about converging, or not, on truth.