Some people think that what makes a good explanation is testability. But this isn’t enough: some theories are perfectly testable but do not constitute good explanations.
The more usual claim is that falsifiability makes something a (scientific) explanation at all, while other factors make it a good explanation.
This book has many different threads to it, but one of the most important is a kind of philosophical treatise about how good explanations come to be. One classical idea, which Deutsch rejects, is that we do so by induction, a doctrine known as inductivism.
So, Deutsch argues against induction as the the source of new scientific theories
Nobody believes any more than that induction is the sole source of scientific explanations. That was a feature of very early philosophy of science , such as Bacon’s. Yet many believe induction has many uses. It is extremely useful to be able to predict future events, even if you can’t explain the mechanism. Which is by no means to say that the explanations, even non predictive ones, have no value.
Empiricism is the philosophical idea that we derive knowledge from our senses. There are a number of problems with this. One is that sense-data by themselves are meaningless. If you had no pre-existing ideas or expectations, you wouldn’t know how to interpret your senses. We do not read from the book of nature. The other major problem with empiricism is how to deal with false perceptions, like optical illusions.
Again, empiricism may have historically been the idea that knowledge is formed by passively registering sense data, or that sense data are infallible, but no serious person believes either anymore.. yet plenty of people still believe in empiricism. Empiricial evidence is standardly used to confirm (justify) and disprove theories.
Popperians use it for the second purpose, but not the first...so they are among those who believe in a form of empiricism. For Popperians, a conjecture is not knowledge until it has been corroborated, and corroboration means attempted refutation, and the classic (but not only) means of refuting a theory is contrary evidence..contrary empirical evidence. So Popperians derive knowledge from the senses, if not entirely from them
The misconception that knowledge needs authority to be genuine or reliable dates back to antiquity, and it still prevails
Justification is not regarded by anyone as a matter of anthropic authority...as far as I know, it never was, so this is not even a historical mistake. And the most widely accepted justification is empirical evidence...which is not anthropic authority. And empirical evidence is reliable enough, so long as you don’t insist on certainty...a lot of these problems are solved by the probabilistic approach.
Lack of falsification makes a theory better, in addition to explanatoriness, and so does confirmation.
(Consider Omega, the hypothetical entity that makes true pronouncements about everything. On the face of it, Omega is the ultimate authority...but actually you have no reason to trust any one pronouncement by Omega, unless you have evidence that Omega has made correct pronouncements in the past, ie. that Omega is reliable. So authority follows follows from reliability, not vice versa!)
What is the explanatory account of how eating grass could cure a cold?
Where’s the evidence, for that matter? Our ancestors followed many practices which work, but for which they had no explanation. They baked and brewed without understanding microbiology, and so on. If you have an explanation without evidence, then it would be a good idea to look for evidence, to test it; and if you have evidence, but no explanation,then it would be a good idea to look for an explanation.
Of course, “working” is an appeal to induction. So if you re- run history with an insistence on explanation, and a disregard for induction, we would be considerably worse off.We are the latest iteration of a dynasty of organisms that made progress without explanations. Lots of progress was achieved without explanations.
I think I wasn’t clear. An explanation that isn’t accurate is still an explanation to Deutsch, it just isn’t a good one. Microbiology or bread-spirits are both explanations for rising bread.
That strengthens the case for explanation being ubiquitous at the expense of the case for explanation being important. What can you do with a bad explanation that you can’t do with no explanation?
Deutsch specifies good explanations (laws of nature, scientific theories), and claims the rapid increase of good explanations is because of the invention of the scientific method, and thus explanations are essential for progress.
A bad explanation allows me to make (bad) sense of the world, which makes it appear less chaotic and threatening.
Ah yes, the spirits are causing the indigestion. Now I know that I need only do a specific dance to please them and the discomfort will resolve.
The alternative is suffering for no apparent reason or recourse. At least until we find a good explanation for indigestion.
I.
The more usual claim is that falsifiability makes something a (scientific) explanation at all, while other factors make it a good explanation.
So, Deutsch argues against induction as the the source of new scientific theories
Nobody believes any more than that induction is the sole source of scientific explanations. That was a feature of very early philosophy of science , such as Bacon’s. Yet many believe induction has many uses. It is extremely useful to be able to predict future events, even if you can’t explain the mechanism. Which is by no means to say that the explanations, even non predictive ones, have no value.
Again, empiricism may have historically been the idea that knowledge is formed by passively registering sense data, or that sense data are infallible, but no serious person believes either anymore.. yet plenty of people still believe in empiricism. Empiricial evidence is standardly used to confirm (justify) and disprove theories.
Popperians use it for the second purpose, but not the first...so they are among those who believe in a form of empiricism. For Popperians, a conjecture is not knowledge until it has been corroborated, and corroboration means attempted refutation, and the classic (but not only) means of refuting a theory is contrary evidence..contrary empirical evidence. So Popperians derive knowledge from the senses, if not entirely from them
Justification is not regarded by anyone as a matter of anthropic authority...as far as I know, it never was, so this is not even a historical mistake. And the most widely accepted justification is empirical evidence...which is not anthropic authority. And empirical evidence is reliable enough, so long as you don’t insist on certainty...a lot of these problems are solved by the probabilistic approach.
Lack of falsification makes a theory better, in addition to explanatoriness, and so does confirmation.
(Consider Omega, the hypothetical entity that makes true pronouncements about everything. On the face of it, Omega is the ultimate authority...but actually you have no reason to trust any one pronouncement by Omega, unless you have evidence that Omega has made correct pronouncements in the past, ie. that Omega is reliable. So authority follows follows from reliability, not vice versa!)
Where’s the evidence, for that matter? Our ancestors followed many practices which work, but for which they had no explanation. They baked and brewed without understanding microbiology, and so on. If you have an explanation without evidence, then it would be a good idea to look for evidence, to test it; and if you have evidence, but no explanation,then it would be a good idea to look for an explanation.
Of course, “working” is an appeal to induction. So if you re- run history with an insistence on explanation, and a disregard for induction, we would be considerably worse off.We are the latest iteration of a dynasty of organisms that made progress without explanations. Lots of progress was achieved without explanations.
(To be continued).
“Our ancestors followed many practices which work, but for which they had no explanation.”
That would be very surprising for a species that reflexively attempts to explain things.
Also, in the book, he specifies that’s he’s explaining the unprecedented rate of consistent progress from the scientific revolution onward.
Edit: I was mistaken. He is trying to explain all progress.
Not really. Failing to do stuff that works will kill you. Doing stuff that works inexplicably won’t.
I think I wasn’t clear. An explanation that isn’t accurate is still an explanation to Deutsch, it just isn’t a good one. Microbiology or bread-spirits are both explanations for rising bread.
That strengthens the case for explanation being ubiquitous at the expense of the case for explanation being important. What can you do with a bad explanation that you can’t do with no explanation?
Deutsch specifies good explanations (laws of nature, scientific theories), and claims the rapid increase of good explanations is because of the invention of the scientific method, and thus explanations are essential for progress.
A bad explanation allows me to make (bad) sense of the world, which makes it appear less chaotic and threatening.
The alternative is suffering for no apparent reason or recourse. At least until we find a good explanation for indigestion.
The lowest limit on bad explanation isnt even zero, it’s negative. For instance, the use of leaching as a cure-all.
Yes, but i’m not sure how that follows from your original question.