I could imagine a world where discussing it is not something I would see as critically unwelcome, but I would still want to maintain part of the mechanism that implements the taboo, which is why I made the comments I did: being able to come to agreement that there are outcomes which are good and bad, such as the previous famous outcomes of ethnonationalism. I suspect that I’ve interpreted you to be saying that those previous outcomes were bad (“While perhaps at first this taboo was valuable”) but it’s not as reliable as the taboo implementation I carry would prefer.
If your view is that virtues are required to be independent of outcomes, in that eg a virtue whose adoption would predictably lead to mass death [edit to finish phrase: would still be a virtue if virtuous by its own merits], then I don’t think they can be truly called virtuous; but if your view is that we can discuss some features of outcomes that make an outcome good or bad, then I would want to discuss what virtues can lead us towards better outcomes by that standard. virtue utilitarianism, if you will, rather than rule utilitarianism[1]; the way I heard virtues described was that a virtue is a local aspiration, a non-totalizing learning process. If there are true things underneath these taboos, and those taboos were preventing those true things from being used to produce outcomes I find abhorrent, then if we are to remove the taboo, I wish to first discuss how we will maintain avoidance of those outcomes I see as bad.
At the same time, I recognize that some taboos that one might imagine were also protecting against bad things have already slipped, and so I would also suggest that we discuss this same thing about those topics.
For example, I think that an outcome I prefer is that people have freedom of association, that the groups be able to mingle non-destructively to a significant degree. A “friendly, non-destructive ethnonationalism” that is prosocial towards nearby ethnonational groups is something I could imagine being a worthy success, though it would strike me as odd, and I would hope it would not be the only kind of state that exists, because I would find it boring.
Also, I would find it odd if ethnonationalism is the only kind of nationalism worth considering, under the assumption that we’re seeking things that can be terminally-valued by a median progressive human.
I doubt that, by default, nationalism is less destructive than it was in the past. And so if we are to remove this taboo, I’d want to establish a way to enter into agreement with a person who will potentially discuss it that we agree on a particular value; not all values, not on everything. but a step towards fusing into a single agent within the particular topic of “do we want the outcomes that were previously the result of nationalism”. Because I don’t think we do, and I hope you also do not; and yet, it may very well be that the standard way of coming to agreement on this topic in current progressive society is one that prevents understanding necessary to achieve avoidance of the outcomes of other bad societal structures, such as a fully centralized command system[2] or a supercritical group[3].
I currently doubt that ethno- or national- are the grouping types that work best, and if you would like to convince me, I would want to understand what “best” is to you. If you will not, then I will be hesitant to further participate in reducing the taboo.
Re: why so much disagreement: because I think you’re trying to remove a taboo that should be there, and so far my impression is that when pressed to explain why it would be good to remove, you retreat to “well, it’s different from other levels of taboo”. My first instinct on realizing that is an obviously-irrational urge to taboo those as well—I don’t think that’s an effective move, so I wrote this comment instead.
@testingthewaters I think you’re jumping to conclusions a bit too quickly about what Richard thinks. Your interpretation is not clearly forbidden but jumping to conclusions in the way you do seems to me to be an error that prevents us from seeking outcomes that I would see as good, because you’re risking overclassifying people as malicious. I don’t think you’d need to do many more rounds of interaction before concluding you’ve identified what you see as malice, in order for the increased carefulness to increase your ability to cooperate with people you don’t fully agree with on important topics.
as you can see, I’m nowhere near being convinced to let go of “outer utilitarianism”, but could easily be convinced to accept “inner virtue ethicism” [edit: since writing this I’ve remembered that you didn’t, as of last discussion, object to processes that compare and rate according to preference, just that those processes may not fit into the type signature of utility functions]
I currently believe this is primarily seen in online discussions and in-person mobs, and I think what testingthewaters was saying feels to me like an instance of attempted irrational superreplicator instantiation, due to not first discussing whether the behavior testingthewaters demands—tabooing the topic—would be according to what you wish to be. However, the pattern you identified as mob dynamics in your talk isn’t obviously the same thing.
I could imagine a world where discussing it is not something I would see as critically unwelcome, but I would still want to maintain part of the mechanism that implements the taboo, which is why I made the comments I did: being able to come to agreement that there are outcomes which are good and bad, such as the previous famous outcomes of ethnonationalism. I suspect that I’ve interpreted you to be saying that those previous outcomes were bad (“While perhaps at first this taboo was valuable”) but it’s not as reliable as the taboo implementation I carry would prefer.
If your view is that virtues are required to be independent of outcomes, in that eg a virtue whose adoption would predictably lead to mass death [edit to finish phrase: would still be a virtue if virtuous by its own merits], then I don’t think they can be truly called virtuous; but if your view is that we can discuss some features of outcomes that make an outcome good or bad, then I would want to discuss what virtues can lead us towards better outcomes by that standard. virtue utilitarianism, if you will, rather than rule utilitarianism[1]; the way I heard virtues described was that a virtue is a local aspiration, a non-totalizing learning process. If there are true things underneath these taboos, and those taboos were preventing those true things from being used to produce outcomes I find abhorrent, then if we are to remove the taboo, I wish to first discuss how we will maintain avoidance of those outcomes I see as bad.
At the same time, I recognize that some taboos that one might imagine were also protecting against bad things have already slipped, and so I would also suggest that we discuss this same thing about those topics.
For example, I think that an outcome I prefer is that people have freedom of association, that the groups be able to mingle non-destructively to a significant degree. A “friendly, non-destructive ethnonationalism” that is prosocial towards nearby ethnonational groups is something I could imagine being a worthy success, though it would strike me as odd, and I would hope it would not be the only kind of state that exists, because I would find it boring.
Also, I would find it odd if ethnonationalism is the only kind of nationalism worth considering, under the assumption that we’re seeking things that can be terminally-valued by a median progressive human.
I doubt that, by default, nationalism is less destructive than it was in the past. And so if we are to remove this taboo, I’d want to establish a way to enter into agreement with a person who will potentially discuss it that we agree on a particular value; not all values, not on everything. but a step towards fusing into a single agent within the particular topic of “do we want the outcomes that were previously the result of nationalism”. Because I don’t think we do, and I hope you also do not; and yet, it may very well be that the standard way of coming to agreement on this topic in current progressive society is one that prevents understanding necessary to achieve avoidance of the outcomes of other bad societal structures, such as a fully centralized command system[2] or a supercritical group[3].
I currently doubt that ethno- or national- are the grouping types that work best, and if you would like to convince me, I would want to understand what “best” is to you. If you will not, then I will be hesitant to further participate in reducing the taboo.
Re: why so much disagreement: because I think you’re trying to remove a taboo that should be there, and so far my impression is that when pressed to explain why it would be good to remove, you retreat to “well, it’s different from other levels of taboo”. My first instinct on realizing that is an obviously-irrational urge to taboo those as well—I don’t think that’s an effective move, so I wrote this comment instead.
@testingthewaters I think you’re jumping to conclusions a bit too quickly about what Richard thinks. Your interpretation is not clearly forbidden but jumping to conclusions in the way you do seems to me to be an error that prevents us from seeking outcomes that I would see as good, because you’re risking overclassifying people as malicious. I don’t think you’d need to do many more rounds of interaction before concluding you’ve identified what you see as malice, in order for the increased carefulness to increase your ability to cooperate with people you don’t fully agree with on important topics.
as you can see, I’m nowhere near being convinced to let go of “outer utilitarianism”, but could easily be convinced to accept “inner virtue ethicism” [edit: since writing this I’ve remembered that you didn’t, as of last discussion, object to processes that compare and rate according to preference, just that those processes may not fit into the type signature of utility functions]
authoritarianism, seen in both ethnonationalist and communist states in recent history
I currently believe this is primarily seen in online discussions and in-person mobs, and I think what testingthewaters was saying feels to me like an instance of attempted irrational superreplicator instantiation, due to not first discussing whether the behavior testingthewaters demands—tabooing the topic—would be according to what you wish to be. However, the pattern you identified as mob dynamics in your talk isn’t obviously the same thing.
This is a thoughtful comment, I appreciate it, and I’ll reply when I have more time (hopefully in a few days).