A Dialectic on Classical Utilitarianism

[James Brobin]

This is a crosspost from my blog article.

In this post, I will do a dialectic on classical utilitarianism by offering my argument for classical utilitarianism, then responding to the best criticisms I can think of against it. (These criticisms will be the best criticisms in my view, not the best criticisms according to others.)

My Argument For Utilitarianism

I believe that classical utilitarianism is the only correct moral philosophy, which is to say I believe that happiness is the only moral good and that we should seek to maximize it.

I believe this is true because:

1. I believe that I can tell that my experience of happiness is objectively morally good.

   1. When I experience happiness, it seems to be good. As a result of this, I believe that my conscious experience must have a moral quality to it, which I am able to directly experience. As a result, I can tell that happiness is good when I experience it.

2. I believe that, since others share many similarities to me, their experience of happiness must also be objectively morally good.

   1. I cannot directly experience others’ experiences so I cannot have complete certainty that their experience of happiness is also morally good. That said, I believe that I have good reason to believe that their experience of happiness is also good since they act similarly to me when experiencing happiness, their descriptions of happiness are similar to my own, and their neurological structures are also similar to my own.

3. I believe that there are no other moral goods.

   1. There are no other moral goods I have heard of that seem to be objectively true to me.

Criticizing My Argument For Utilitarianism

I think there are five major criticisms to my argument for utilitarianism:

1. It is unreasonable for me to believe that my experiences are objectively morally good, just because they seem good.

   1. I think this is a strong counterargument because I don’t think there is any way in which I can truly justify my claim that my experiences are objectively morally good, merely because they seem good to me.

      1. That said, I do think that this claim is somewhat reasonable since you can independently verify whether your own experiences seem good or bad to you and because it is the best explanation I know of for thinking that we can know what objective moral truths are.

2. Even if I am able to assess my experiences as good or bad, it is unreasonable for me to believe that my assessment could be accurate.

   1. I think this is unreasonable because I think we should assume that a faculty (in this case our capacity to accurately assess our experiences as good or bad) is working correctly unless we have good reason to assume it is not.

3. My argument is unfalsifiable. Since no one else can experience my experiences, they cannot independently assess whether or not they seem good.

   1. I think this criticism is unreasonable because it presumes that the set of things which we should reasonably believe is contained within the set of things that can be determined scientifically. I think that my experience of consciousness is a source of information that I should take seriously even if others don’t have access to it.

4. My argument makes the unreasonable conclusion that since others are similar to me, their experience of happiness is also morally good. Since I do not directly experience their experiences, I should not be willing to comment on them.

   1. I think this is unreasonable because it seems like the conclusion that other’s experiences must be similar to my own since they as people are similar to me is reasonable.

5. My argument makes the unreasonable conclusion that since others are similar to me, their experience of happiness is also morally good. This is unreasonable because some people don’t consider happiness good or bad and some even consider it bad.

   1. I think this is probably the strongest criticism against classical utilitarianism. Ultimately, I think that people conclude that happiness is bad not because it is bad, but instead because they have strong social pressures to believe so. I believe that, given enough time and resources to engage in meaningful moral reflection, they would come to the belief that happiness is morally good. This is certainly not a perfect counterargument and a good reason to have some uncertainty about whether classical utilitarianism is really true.

Conclusion

Overall, I think I still have good reason to think that classical utilitarianism is true. I have some uncertainty about whether or not I actually can tell whether or not my experiences are good or bad. I also think that, since some people don’t think happiness is good, I have good reason to have at least some uncertainty about whether or not happiness is actually morally good. As such, I still believe in classical utilitarianism, but I do have some uncertainty about this belief.

[Jiro]

Ultimately, I think that people conclude that happiness is bad not because it is bad, but instead because they have strong social pressures to believe so. I believe that, given enough time and resources to engage in meaningful moral reflection, they would come to the belief that happiness is morally good.

You are just dismissing disagreement. Blissful ignorance results in happiness. I believe that it is bad anyway. Obviously I can’t prove that this is not due to social pressures, but that claim is unfalsifiable.

You also don’t seem to be addressing common criticisms. For instance, your post makes no mention of utility monsters, or of the repugnant conclusion.