I’m somewhat skeptical that models will actually be able to robustly learn these kinds of abstractions with a reasonable amount of scaling
GPT-3 (without external calculators) can do very well on math word problems (https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.02336) that combine basic facts about the world with abstract math reasoning. Why think that the kind of causal reasoning humans do is out of reach of scaling (especially if you allow external calculators)? It doesn’t seem different in kind from these math word problems.
when can/do foundation models internalize explicitly stated knowledge
Some human causal reasoning is explicit. Humans can’t do complex and exact calculations using System 1 intuition, and neither can we do causal reasoning of any sophistication using System 1. The prior over causal relations (e.g. that without looking at any data ‘smoking causes cancer’ is way more likely than the reverse) is more about general world-model building, and maybe there’s more uncertainty about how well scaling learns that.
RE GPT-3, etc. doing well on math problems: the key word in my response was “robustly”. I think there is a big qualitative difference between “doing a good job on a certain distribution of math problems” and “doing math (robustly)”. This could be obscured by the fact that people also make mathematical errors sometimes, but I think the type of errors is importantly different from those made by DNNs.
This is a distribution of math problems GPT-3 wasn’t finetuned on. Yet it’s able to few-shot generalize and perform well. This is an amazing level of robustness relative to 2018 deep learning systems. I don’t see why scaling and access to external tools (e.g. to perform long calculations) wouldn’t produce the kind of robustness you have in mind.
I think you’re moving the goal-posts, since before you mentioned “without external calculators”. I think external tools are likely to be critical to doing this, and I’m much more optimistic about that path to doing this kind of robust generalization. I don’t think that necessarily addresses concerns about how the system reasons internally, though, which still seems likely to be critical for alignment.
GPT-3 (without external calculators) can do very well on math word problems (https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.02336) that combine basic facts about the world with abstract math reasoning. Why think that the kind of causal reasoning humans do is out of reach of scaling (especially if you allow external calculators)? It doesn’t seem different in kind from these math word problems.
Some human causal reasoning is explicit. Humans can’t do complex and exact calculations using System 1 intuition, and neither can we do causal reasoning of any sophistication using System 1. The prior over causal relations (e.g. that without looking at any data ‘smoking causes cancer’ is way more likely than the reverse) is more about general world-model building, and maybe there’s more uncertainty about how well scaling learns that.
RE GPT-3, etc. doing well on math problems: the key word in my response was “robustly”. I think there is a big qualitative difference between “doing a good job on a certain distribution of math problems” and “doing math (robustly)”. This could be obscured by the fact that people also make mathematical errors sometimes, but I think the type of errors is importantly different from those made by DNNs.
This is a distribution of math problems GPT-3 wasn’t finetuned on. Yet it’s able to few-shot generalize and perform well. This is an amazing level of robustness relative to 2018 deep learning systems. I don’t see why scaling and access to external tools (e.g. to perform long calculations) wouldn’t produce the kind of robustness you have in mind.
I think you’re moving the goal-posts, since before you mentioned “without external calculators”. I think external tools are likely to be critical to doing this, and I’m much more optimistic about that path to doing this kind of robust generalization. I don’t think that necessarily addresses concerns about how the system reasons internally, though, which still seems likely to be critical for alignment.