Oh sorry. I somehow missed this aspect of your comment.
Here’s a definition of takeover-capable AI that I like: the AI is capable enough that plausible interventions on known human controlled institutions within a few months no longer suffice to prevent plausible takeover. (Which implies that making the situation clear to the world is substantially less useful and human controlled institutions can no longer as easily get a seat at the table.)
Under this definition, there are basically two relevant conditions:
The AI is capable enough to itself take over autonomously. (In the way you defined it, but also not in a way where intervening on human institutions can still prevent the takeover, so e.g.., the AI just having a rogue deployment within OpenAI doesn’t suffice if substantial externally imposed improvements to OpenAI’s security and controls would defeat the takeover attempt.)
Or human groups can do a nearly immediate takeover with the AI such that they could then just resist such interventions.
Hm — what are the “plausible interventions” that would stop China from having >25% probability of takeover if no other country could build powerful AI? Seems like you either need to count a delay as successful prevention, or you need to have a pretty low bar for “plausible”, because it seems extremely difficult/costly to prevent China from developing powerful AI in the long run. (Where they can develop their own supply chains, put manufacturing and data centers underground, etc.)
Oh sorry. I somehow missed this aspect of your comment.
Here’s a definition of takeover-capable AI that I like: the AI is capable enough that plausible interventions on known human controlled institutions within a few months no longer suffice to prevent plausible takeover. (Which implies that making the situation clear to the world is substantially less useful and human controlled institutions can no longer as easily get a seat at the table.)
Under this definition, there are basically two relevant conditions:
The AI is capable enough to itself take over autonomously. (In the way you defined it, but also not in a way where intervening on human institutions can still prevent the takeover, so e.g.., the AI just having a rogue deployment within OpenAI doesn’t suffice if substantial externally imposed improvements to OpenAI’s security and controls would defeat the takeover attempt.)
Or human groups can do a nearly immediate takeover with the AI such that they could then just resist such interventions.
I’ll clarify this in the comment.
Hm — what are the “plausible interventions” that would stop China from having >25% probability of takeover if no other country could build powerful AI? Seems like you either need to count a delay as successful prevention, or you need to have a pretty low bar for “plausible”, because it seems extremely difficult/costly to prevent China from developing powerful AI in the long run. (Where they can develop their own supply chains, put manufacturing and data centers underground, etc.)
Yeah, I’m trying to include delay as fine.
I’m just trying to point at “the point when aggressive intervention by a bunch of parties is potentially still too late”.