They’re in conflict with the unmeasurable unknown part of the world. As I read it (correct me if I’m wrong), if there is only a single probabilistic model (bayesian reduction?) then it will follow the expected maximum.
If there are multiple possible models, then it will assume the worst model. But to assume better, something like Kierkegaard’s leap of faith needed, believeing a model not based on reason. I mean, the infra-parts tries to say something about very unknown models, so it’s somewhat on the boundary of reason, and it’s possible that the logical apparatus stops.
There’s reason to assume the unmeasurably unknown parts of the world are benevolent, because it is easier for multiple actors to coordinate for benevolent purposes than malevolent purposes. That infrabayesians then assume they’re in conflict with the presumably-benevolent hidden purposes means that the infrabayesians probably are malevolent.
They’re in conflict with the unmeasurable unknown part of the world. As I read it (correct me if I’m wrong), if there is only a single probabilistic model (bayesian reduction?) then it will follow the expected maximum.
If there are multiple possible models, then it will assume the worst model. But to assume better, something like Kierkegaard’s leap of faith needed, believeing a model not based on reason. I mean, the infra-parts tries to say something about very unknown models, so it’s somewhat on the boundary of reason, and it’s possible that the logical apparatus stops.
There’s reason to assume the unmeasurably unknown parts of the world are benevolent, because it is easier for multiple actors to coordinate for benevolent purposes than malevolent purposes. That infrabayesians then assume they’re in conflict with the presumably-benevolent hidden purposes means that the infrabayesians probably are malevolent.