Hm—reading Ben’s linked comment, it seems to me that the thrust is that negative probabilities must be admitted. But I don’t understand how that is related to the map vs. territory / probability-in-the-mind-or-physical distinction?
Like, “one must modify the relevant functions to allow negative probabilities” seems consistent with “probability is in the mind”, since functions are a part of the map, but it seems you consider it a counterexample! So I find myself confused.
The main point here is that it can no longer be just our uncertainty in our map, something else must be added, which was the point.
Another way to say it is that probability can’t just be in the mind, so while the probabilities encode our ignorance, it can’t be all of the story (according to Wigner functions).
It was way down in the last comment, so maybe you should go to the end of the comment I linked here for more information.
Also, a difference here that doesn’t matter for this discussion, but might matter for the general approach, might ultimately be that I disagree with this statement “since functions are a part of the map”, because I think the map-territory distinction can often be blurry or fully dissolved in some cases, and also functions can have results when you evaluate them using an algorithm, making them part of the territory (for that specific function).
Hm—reading Ben’s linked comment, it seems to me that the thrust is that negative probabilities must be admitted. But I don’t understand how that is related to the map vs. territory / probability-in-the-mind-or-physical distinction?
Like, “one must modify the relevant functions to allow negative probabilities” seems consistent with “probability is in the mind”, since functions are a part of the map, but it seems you consider it a counterexample! So I find myself confused.
The main point here is that it can no longer be just our uncertainty in our map, something else must be added, which was the point.
Another way to say it is that probability can’t just be in the mind, so while the probabilities encode our ignorance, it can’t be all of the story (according to Wigner functions).
It was way down in the last comment, so maybe you should go to the end of the comment I linked here for more information.
Also, a difference here that doesn’t matter for this discussion, but might matter for the general approach, might ultimately be that I disagree with this statement “since functions are a part of the map”, because I think the map-territory distinction can often be blurry or fully dissolved in some cases, and also functions can have results when you evaluate them using an algorithm, making them part of the territory (for that specific function).